金融工程與財(cái)務(wù)管理12-資料下載頁
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【正文】 9年第4期2 陳小悅,肖星,過曉艷. 配股權(quán)與上市公司利潤(rùn)操縱. 經(jīng)濟(jì)研究, 2000年第1期3 Spence, . Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, 87 : 355－3744 Spence, . Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signaling: An Analysis of Efficiency and Distribution. Journal of Economic Theory, 1974 , 8 : 296－332Asymmetric Information Perspective on Profit Manipulation of Listed CompaniesJiang Chuanhai（Research Institute of Accounting and Finance, Department of Information and Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai ,China,200433）Abstract This article studies the inherent motivation of listed panies who make profit manipulation. The theory and methods of asymmetric information dynamic game theory have been used in this paper, and profit manipulation of listed panies is modeled as a signal game. The research indicates that high profitearning type listed panies are more intend to make manipulation than low profitearning type listed panies, because they want to differ from the low profitearning type listed panies. This conclusion is well explained the empirical results in Chen Xiaoyue、Xiao xing、Guo xiaoyan（2000）.Keywords Profit manipulation Asymmetric information Bayes equilibrium578 /
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