農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)中有效需求與供給不足的效用層面分析-資料下載頁
2025-06-23 14:07本頁面
【正文】 nsurance during the 1990s. Agricultural Finance Review, 63(2): 109125[25] Terence J. Centner amp。 Michael E. Wetzstein (1987). Reducing Moral Hazard Associated With Implied Warranties of Animal Health, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 69: 143~150[26] Knight, ., amp。 . Coble. (1997). Survey of . Multiple Peril Crop Insurace Literature Since 1980 [J], Review of Agricultural Economics (spring summer [19]) 128156[27] Von Neumann, J and O. Morgenstern. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press.[28] Wright, ., amp。 . Hewitt. (1990). All Risk Crop Insurance: Lessons From Theory and Experience. Giannini Foundation, California Agricultural Experiment Station, Berkeley, April.[29] Zering, ., . McCorkle, and C. V. Moore (1987). The Utility of Multiple Peril Crop Insurance for Irrigated, MultipleCrop Agriculture. West. J. Agr. Econ. 12 (July):509One explain on the lacking demand of agricultural insurance from utility angle of viewZhang yuehua, Gu haiying,Shi qinghuaEconomic and Financial department, Management SchoolShanghai Jiaotong University, 200052Abstract Agricultural Insurance in China Started in 1930s, but it had little resemblance to the limited insurance categories that are available to the Chinese farmers now. Following Wright and Hewitt (1994), many Chinese researchers follow the assumption of risk preference of Chinese farmers when analyzing the fact that there is the lack of interests of Chinese farmers in agricultural insurances, but few has touched the evolution of farmers risk preference with their ine levels. We have conducted a fourprovincesurvey to categorize the farmers’ risk preference and their ine level, and used ArrowPratt measurement to characterize the changes of risk preferences in different ine levels. Our initial finding is that the lack of demand for agricultural insurance in China results from the inadequate ine in most rural areas, and the farmers will bee more risk aversion once their ine reaches a threshold level. Therefore, it is left to the government to jumpstart the initial agricultural insurance program in China. Given the positive externality of the agricultural insurance, we predict that the government sponsored agricultural insurance program is a more efficient way of using government transfer to farmers than direct production related support.Key words: agricultural insurance, crop insurance, Market failure, Assumption聯(lián)系方式：張躍華 上海市華山路1954號(hào) 上海交通大學(xué)286信箱 郵政編碼：200030電話：02162829314（辦）02155541010（家）13918446076（上海）電子郵件：zhangyuehua@ 。 newsgrope@11 / 11
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