【導(dǎo)讀】Monopoly. MonopolyPower. Monopsony. MonopsonyPower. P=LMC=LRAC. Homogenousproduct. Perfectinformation. Firmisapricetaker. Monopoly. marginalcost.Asthesoleproducer,themonopolistworks. outputandprice.P=6-Q. Observations. MR=P. Monopolist’sOutputDecision. decreaseincost(MR>MC).AnExample. AnExample. AnExample. AnExample. ismaximizedatP=$30andQ=10.t'

　　

【正文】 lar goods. Chapter 10 Slide 111 Price Discrimination ? First Degree Price Discrimination ? Charge a separate price to each customer: the maximum or reservation price they are willing to pay. Chapter 10 Slide 112 P* Q* Without price discrimination, output is Q* and price is P*. Variable profit is the area between the MC amp。 MR (yellow). Additional Profit From Perfect FirstDegree Price Discrimination Quantity $/Q Pmax With perfect discrimination, each consumer pays the maximum price they are willing to pay. Consumer surplus is the area above P* and between 0 and Q* output. D = AR MR MC Output expands to Q** and price falls to PC where MC = MR = AR = D. Profits increase by the area above MC between old MR and D to output Q** (purple) Q** PC Chapter 10 Slide 113 P* Q* Consumer surplus when a single price P* is charged. Variable profit when a single price P* is charged. Additional profit from perfect price discrimination Quantity $/Q Pmax D = AR MR MC Q** PC With perfect discrimination ? Each customer pays their reservation price ?Profits increase Additional Profit From Perfect FirstDegree Price Discrimination Chapter 10 Slide 114 ? Question ? Why would a producer have difficulty in achieving firstdegree price discrimination? ? Answer 1) Too many customers (impractical) 2) Could not estimate the reservation price for each customer Additional Profit From Perfect FirstDegree Price Discrimination Chapter 10 Slide 115 Price Discrimination ? First Degree Price Discrimination ? The model does demonstrate the potential profit (incentive) of practicing price discrimination to some degree. Chapter 10 Slide 116 Price Discrimination ? First Degree Price Discrimination ? Examples of imperfect price discrimination where the seller has the ability to segregate the market to some extent and charge different prices for the same product: ?Lawyers, doctors, accountants ?Colleges and universities Chapter 10 Slide 117 FirstDegree Price Discrimination in Practice Quantity D MR MC $/Q P2 P3 P*4 P5 P6 P1 Six prices exist resulting in higher profits. With a single price P*4, there are few consumers and those who pay P5 or P6 may have a surplus. Q Chapter 10 Slide 118 SecondDegree Price Discrimination Quantity $/Q D MR MC AC P0 Q0 Without discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0. With seconddegree discrimination there are three prices P1, P2, and P3. (. electric utilities) P1 Q1 1st Block P2 Q2 P3 Q3 2nd Block 3rd Block Seconddegree price discrimination is pricing according to quantity consumedor in blocks. Chapter 10 Slide 119 SecondDegree Price Discrimination Quantity $/Q D MR MC AC P0 Q0 P1 Q1 1st Block P2 Q2 P3 Q3 2nd Block 3rd Block Economies of scale permit: ?Increase consumer welfare ?Higher profits Chapter 10 Slide 120 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination 1) Divides the market into twogroups. 2) Each group has its own demand function. Chapter 10 Slide 121 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination 3) Most mon type of price discrimination. ?Examples: airlines, liquor, vegetables, discounts to students and senior citizens. Chapter 10 Slide 122 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination 4) Thirddegree price discrimination is feasible when the seller can separate his/her market into groups who have different price elasticities of demand (. business air travelers versus vacation air travelers) Chapter 10 Slide 123 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination ? Objectives ?MR1 = MR2 ?MC1 = MR1 and MC2 = MR2 ?MR1 = MR2 = MC Chapter 10 Slide 124 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination ? P1: price first group ? P2: price second group ? C(Qr) = total cost of QT = Q1 + Q2 ? Profit ( ) = P1Q1 + P2Q2 C(Qr) ?Chapter 10 Slide 125 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination ? Set incremental for sales to group 1 = 0 ? ? ?0(11)111?????????QCPQ?MCQCMRP ???????11111 )(Chapter 10 Slide 126 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination ? Second group of customers: MR2 = MC ? MR1 = MR2 = MC Chapter 10 Slide 127 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination ? Determining relative prices ? ? ?)11()11(11222111 EPMREPMREPMR d??????? :T h e n :R e ca l lChapter 10 Slide 128 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination ? Determining relative prices ? ? Pricing: Charge higher price to group with a low demand elasticity )11()11(1221EEPP??? :A n dChapter 10 Slide 129 Price Discrimination ? Third Degree Price Discrimination ? Example: E1 = 2 amp。 E2 = 4 ? ? P1 should be times as high as P2 )211()411(21 ?????PP Chapter 10 Slide 130 ThirdDegree Price Discrimination Quantity D2 = AR2 MR2 $/Q D1 = AR1 MR1 Consumers are divided into two groups, with separate demand curves for each group. MRT MRT = MR1 + MR2 Chapter 10 Slide 131 ThirdDegree Price Discrimination Quantity D2 = AR2 MR2 $/Q D1 = AR1 MR1 MRT MC Q2 P2 QT ?QT: MC = MRT ?Group 1: P1Q1 。 more elastic ?Group 2: P2Q2。 more inelastic ?MR1 = MR2 = MC ?QT control MC Q1 P1 MC = MR1 at Q1 and P1 Chapter 10 Slide 132 Comparing to Production with Two Plants Quantity $/Q D = AR MR MC1 MC2 MCT MR* Q1 Q2 Q3 P* Chapter 10 Slide 133 No Sales to Smaller Market Even if thirddegree price discrimination is feasible, it doesn’t always pay to sell to bot