責(zé)任代理模式分析報(bào)告(編輯修改稿)
2025-03-09 12:47 本頁面
【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 t, which level of effort (e1, e2, or e3) would you demand? Question 2: If you, the principal, can closely monitor and observe the agent at all time, what are the amount and condition of payment? And, what is the expected payoff for the principal? Dr. ChakTong Chau 15 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Now, let’s assume that you cannot monitor and observe the agent directly. What would you, as the agent, do? Now, can you see the agency problems here? Effort level Expected utility of the agent E1=6 18,496189。 62 = 100 E2=5 18,496189。 52 = 111 E3=4 18,496189。 42 = 112 Is it likely to have the “adverse selection” problem? How about the “moral hazard” problem? And, the horizon problem? Residual loss? Dr. ChakTong Chau 16 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials What can we say, up to this point? ? Under condition of unobservability (inplete information), fixed payments to agents (. workers, employees) most likely do not work. ? What are then the alternatives? ? We can give the principal a fixed payment instead. ? Or, we can e up with an “incentive patible” conditional contract. Dr. ChakTong Chau 17 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Fixed Payment to the Principal Consider this new contract under which the principal gets $32,750 no matter what happens and the agent keeps the rest. Will this work? Effort level Expected payoff to the agent E1=6 [(55,000189。+40,000189。)32,750]36= E2=5 [(55,000189。+40,000189。)32,750]25= E3=4 [(55,000189。+40,000189。)32,750]16= Dr. ChakTong Chau 18 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Fixed Payment to the Principal ? Thus, numerically this will work to ensure that the agent gives the highest effort. ? However, there is noheless a loss to the principal (33,50432,750)=754 which is in a sense a monitoring cost (maximum cost to pay for an information system to reveal the agent’s effort level). ? But the most fundamental problem is that this type of contracts violates the “risk adverse” nature of the agent. Now the agent bees the principal! Dr. ChakTong Chau 19 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Incentive Compatible Contract – Problem Setup Maximize (55,000 – R55)Φ55(e1) + (40,000R40)Φ40 (e1) Subject to: R55189。Φ55(e1) + R40189。Φ40(e1) e12 = 100 R55189。Φ55(e1) + R40189。Φ40(e1) e12 ? R55189。Φ55(e2) + R40189。Φ40(e2) – e22 R55189。Φ55(e1) + R40189。Φ40(e1) e12 ?
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