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mand ? Profit function ? According to Inverse elasticity rule (Lerner index), in every market should exists ? Optimal pricing means setting paratively high price in market with lower elasticity. niii1q D ( p )?? ?nni i i i ii 1 i 1p D ( p ) C ( D ( p ) )???????iiip M C 1p ?? ? MR1 D1 MR2 D2 MC p1 p2 Q1 Q2 Welfare pare ? Compare it with the result of uniform pricing ? Assume that scale reward fixed: ? C is constant iiiiC ( q ) c ( q )???Profit and surplus ? In case of price discrimination, price in market i is pi, profit as below ? General consumer surplus is ? In case of uniform pricing, price is ,sales amount in market I is , profit as below ? General consumer surplus is iii (p c )q??iii S (p )?p?iiq D (p )???ii (p c ) q????ii S (p )??Difference on welfare ? ?i i i i i ii i iW S ( p ) S ( p ) ( p c) q ( p c) q? ? ?????? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????? ? ?ii iq q q?? ? ??General difference equals to change of surplus plus profit ?To set up limit and down limit, make ?Function of NSW is convex function of market price, and S’ (p) = D (p) , according to Lagrange median theory,we can get ?So, if price discrimination cannot increase sales volume, welfare will be reduced. That is the necessary condition of existence of price discrimination in the social angle. ? ? ??????? ))(()( iii qcpwqcpConclusion ? Generally, the welfare effect of the thirddegree price discrimination is uncertain. It depends on the pare between loss of lowelasticity parison and gain of highelasticity consumers and suppliers. ? One of the central question in policy is its influence to ine distribution. Price discrimination transfers benefit of lowelasticity consumers partly to highelasticity consumers and suppliers. ? It may be not appropriate, but as we know , lowelasticity consumers are generally (not always) richer group. 三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視實(shí)例 1 Office2021在新加坡的定價(jià) 常規(guī)價(jià)格 學(xué)術(shù)機(jī)構(gòu)價(jià)格 Excel 579 199 Power Point 579 199 Word 579 199 三件產(chǎn)品的組合 759 219 中國大使館在新加坡的簽證費(fèi) 簽證提前時(shí)間 1天 3天 7天 單次入境 75 60 25 雙次入境 85 70 35 三級(jí)價(jià)格歧視實(shí)例 2:迪斯尼世界門票價(jià)格, 2021 成人門票的類型 非佛羅里達(dá)居民 佛羅里達(dá)居民 所有主題公園、水上樂園和歡樂島優(yōu)惠年票 539 429 4個(gè)主題公園的年票 415 325 淡季佛羅里達(dá)居民四個(gè)主題公園季票 不提供 215 4天, 4個(gè)主題公園季票 195 171 1天, 1個(gè)主題公園季票 63 Seconddegree price discrimination ? Assumption: consumer demand is heterogeneous. ? If monopoly know about tastes of all consumers, it can make perfect price discrimination through providing personal consume packages or bundles. ? But monopoly generally cannot classify consumers according to some explicit information, and it can provide a menu for selection. Then possibility of arbitrage must be considered, namely consumers belonging to one group may choose consume package designed for other groups. ? The restriction of selfselection or incentivepatible. indirect price discrimination based on time 航空公司基于訂票時(shí)間的價(jià)格歧視 p 起飛時(shí)間 預(yù)售時(shí)間 票價(jià)與提前訂票時(shí)間的關(guān)系 提前訂票時(shí)間 23天 Indirect price discrimination based on quality ? Product lines with different quality status ? Different kinds of consumers: high value type,low value type Common strategy:“ harmed‖ goods, IBM,Sony, Intel p Product status 400 350 300 600 486SX 486 質(zhì)量歧視的三個(gè)決策: ? 廠商應(yīng)該確定幾種不同的等