英文版產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)教程第4章價(jià)格歧視(完整版)
【正文】 ation ? In linear pricing, monopoly price： p= ? Two part tariff： set as consumer surplus in petitive price p = , set ―license fee‖ A = , so pricing project as below T(q)= ? Profit pare： Monopoly pricing： = Two part tariff： mpcScpcS /ncc Spqn?0 If q0 If q=0 m? m m mp q C (q )?c c c cS p q C ( q )? ? ? ?Profit pare m?cpCqD MC A B C =△ ABC ?Obviously, all the consumer surplus is grabbed in two part tariff. (3) Universal case ? Assumption： consumers hold different demand curves, and monopoly know about them. ? Optimal project： set p = , and ask each consumer pay its surplus as ―license fee‖ , namely ? Problem of information reveal when consumer has unit demand and supplier only know distribution of estimation among them but no about everyone’s estimation, it will set single price —— means no price discrimination. cpciiAS?cci i iT A p q??How to make Perfect price discrimination In fact it’s a question of information emerging ? Compretively use coupon or accumulated consuming volumes ? Auction or bid ? Pricing in bind ? Bargaining directly 優(yōu)惠券的使用 (Journal of Marketing Research, 1978) 就業(yè) 狀態(tài) 產(chǎn)品種類 鋁箔 蠟紙 頭痛藥 清潔液 面巾紙 就業(yè) %(62) %(62) %(76) %(92) %(116) 失業(yè) %(128) %(153) %(161) %(214) %(226) 表中條目是有使用優(yōu)惠券傾向的全職主婦購(gòu)買商品的比例 括號(hào)中的數(shù)字表示所表示比例的抽取樣本中人數(shù) Thirddegree price discrimination（ Multimarket） assumption： ? Monopoly can segment consumers in some groups according to some exogenous information, and know about each of their demand curves. ? No arbitrage among groups, and monopoly can’t practise price discrimination in one group. ? A special example of multiple products monopoly pricing： independent demand and interdependent cost How to prevent arbitrage ? 持卡、憑證 ? 擔(dān)保（轉(zhuǎn)售限制，尤其是對(duì)于中間商） ? 摻雜 ? 交易費(fèi)用 ? 合約 ? 垂直一體化 專欄：航空公司如何防止套利？ Profit maximization ? General demand ? Profit function ? According to Inverse elasticity rule (Lerner index), in every market should exists ? Optimal pricing means setting paratively high price in market with lower elasticity. niii1q D ( p )?? ?nni i i i ii 1 i 1p D ( p ) C ( D ( p ) )???????iiip M C 1p ?? ? MR1 D1 MR2 D2 MC p1 p2 Q1 Q2 Welfare pare ? Compare it with the result of uniform pricing ? Assume that scale reward fixed： ? C is constant iiiiC ( q ) c ( q )???Profit and surplus ? In case of price discrimination, price in market i is pi, profit as below ? General consumer surplus is ? In case of uniform pricing, price is ,sales amount in market I is , profit as below ? General consumer surplus is iii (p c )q??iii S (p )?p?iiq D (p )???ii (p c ) q????ii S (p )??Difference on welfare ? ?i i i i i ii i iW S ( p ) S ( p ) ( p c) q ( p c) q? ? ?????? ? ? ? ? ? ?????????? ? ?ii iq q q?? ? ??General difference equals to change of surplus plus profit ?To set up limit and down limit, make ?Function of NSW is convex function of market price, and S’ (p) = D (p) , according to Lagrange median theory,we can get ?So, if price discrimination cannot increase sales volume, welfare will be reduced. That is
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