國(guó)家外貿(mào)專業(yè)外文資料翻譯---中國(guó)的自由貿(mào)易談判：經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，安全和外交政策-國(guó)際貿(mào)易(編輯修改稿)
2025-02-24 08:23 本頁(yè)面
【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 a’s motives for engaging in FTAs in general, and crossregional FTAs in particular. The purpose of our chapteris thus threefold: first to summarize China’s FTA initiative, second to assess China’s motives, and third to explore the usefulness of Sol237。s and Katada’s conceptual frame work regarding Asian crossregionalism. While not denying China’s undoubted uniqueness, this essay presumes that China’s FTA policies may usefully be pared with the trade policies of its Asian neighbors and other major economic actors outside Asia, and that a mon framework of crossregional FTA analysis can have descriptive and analytic value for scholars of Asian trade policies. It concludes that the China case supports the hypotheses distilled by Sol237。s and Katada regarding governments’ motives in FTA negotiations. China’s recent interest in FTA negotiations appears to be consistent with hypothesized economic and leverage motives. Furthermore, the crossregional FTAs also serve China’s security and diplomatic interests. Inasmuch as enhancing the country’s “prehensive national power” is central to Beijing’s longterm strategy, economic initiatives like FTA negotiations are valued in Beijing for their positive political and security implications. A Late Arrival to FTAs China’s relatively late arrival in the vibrant FTA negotiating arena may be explained by two possibilities. As suggested by Elaine S. Kwei, the first possibility is that China’s leaders saw China’s interests served best by participation in global and regional trade frameworks rather than bilateral China’s assiduous pursuit of World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and its strong leadership role in the APEC forum give support to this hypothesis. Thus Premier Zhu Rongji’s agreement in November 2021 to an ASEAN proposal for a possible FTA took Chinawatchers by surprise because it seemed to constitute a departure from China’s previous multilateralism in trade However, from another perspective this agreement could be construed as consistent with China’s growing interest in Asian regionalism. As Chinese analyst Liu Changli summed up, “the speed of trade liberalization (under the WTO) is determined by the slowest boat,” and China was signaling its intention to join a potentially faster regional According to another analyst, China’s leaders have e to appreciate that “economic regionalization affects China more than economic globalisation.” Furthermore, China’s negotiators developed a realistic understanding of their limited influence in multilateral talks. This is the case not only in the WTO but also in APEC and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), fora which enpassed some of the world’s largest economies such as the United States, Japan and the EU. But APEC was not making much progress,9 and ASEM, as an informal dialogue forum, seemed even less effective in facilitating trade talks. With its trade growing more than 40 times from US$ billion in 1978 to US$ billion in 2021, China was determined to pursue trade liberalization. Having noted the slow progress and its limited influence in multilateral talks, China became increasingly interested in the potential for regional liberalization, an arena in which it could play a stronger and more effective role. This partly explains why China embarked on its FTA with ASEAN and launched other regional cooperation proposals. On the other hand, in the early part of the decade, China moved cautiously in developing the FTA with ASEAN and in the interim did not undertake bilateral FTA
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