【正文】 e best interest of all. For the longer term, few doubt that China must adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime in this postBreton Woods environment. A flexible RMB will allow China to conduct independent moary policy (with an open capital account) and minimize the impact of fluctuations of major currencies, especially the . dollar’s gyrations against the euro and the yen. China’s outward investment needs are growing rapidly and would benefit from a flexible RMB. But first, China needs to clean up the banking system, adjust capital accounts, and develop healthy and robust domestic financial markets. We can expect that a flexible exchange rate will improve China’s overall financial system. China has so far learned valuable lessons of the perils of opening the market too soon and allowing a currency to appreciate too fast from the experience of Japan and Southeast Asia. Going forward, it needs to study the positive lessons of liberalizing the exchange rates. The successful cases studies of Poland (from the dollar peg in 1990 to free float in 2020) and Chile (from fixed rate in 1981 to plete float in 1999) clearly show that liberalization can be acplished without a major crisis。 BCA, 2020。對(duì)多邊外部平衡方面而言，我們覺得很難說中國的貨幣對(duì)其貿(mào)易和國際收支盈余有很大的促進(jìn)作用，尤其是如果從 1997 年的角度來看， 人民幣承受巨大的貶值壓力。 中國會(huì)屈服于這些壓力嗎 除了政治上的考慮，我們將在后面討論，人民幣是否流動(dòng)現(xiàn)在變成一個(gè)復(fù)雜的問題，涉及到幾個(gè)因素。隨著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)放緩，近來，對(duì)能源和大 宗商品的需求依然強(qiáng)勁，這很可能使石油和商品價(jià)格居高不下，從而對(duì)中國和其他亞洲國家增加進(jìn)口費(fèi)用，又減少了對(duì)人民幣的壓力來源。盡管在整體通脹率顯示上升，但核心通貨膨脹率仍然很低?？傮w狀況看，人民幣盯住美元，中國的對(duì)外賬戶盈余和外匯儲(chǔ)備增加三者之間的關(guān)系，不是像經(jīng)常討論的那么容易說清楚。展望未來，中國需要研究開放、積極的匯率制度。匯率為他們唾手可得，即使是一個(gè)小水果，從中醫(yī)角度，一個(gè)不成熟的、真正有效的措施，如解決國內(nèi)需求的不平衡和促進(jìn)美國商品和服務(wù)出口， 這 不幸的政治并非在 美國首發(fā)。正如在北京的一位著名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家最近觀察到，“比起中央銀行，其他一些高級(jí)官員更想談?wù)剠R率問題，還有更迫切的事情要處理。但最近，由于人民幣升值預(yù)期已經(jīng)提高，這部分資本也在尋找升值的路。 購買力平價(jià)學(xué)說是一個(gè)古老的經(jīng)濟(jì)概念，至少可以追溯到大衛(wèi)休謨（ 1752），已經(jīng)經(jīng)歷了至少一次復(fù)興。出現(xiàn)了 許多 關(guān)于人民幣不確定估值的研究和自相矛盾的結(jié)果。 and conventional wisdom does not apply to China, because by any measure it is an undeveloped nation for which a currency peg is useful to maintain domestic economic and political stability (Prasad et al., 2020). In terms of multilateral external balances, we find it hard to argue that China’s currency is contributing much to its trade and balance of payment surpluses, especially if one takes the 1997 perspective when the RMB was under tremendous depreciation pressure. Indeed, there is clear evidence that if China’s trade balance was evenly distributed among its trading partners, there would be hardly any pressure for China to appreciate its currency. Thus, the pressure is political and structural in nature, originating from the large and growing multilateral trade imbalance of the United States. Unfortunately, it is much easier to blame China than to attack the underlying structural causes of the . trade deficit. We conclude that the political pressure on China to abandon the RMB’s peg to the dollar is likely to persist, and—as the most important growth market in the world today—China is more likely to move sooner rather than later to demonstrate that, in spite of the risks to its fragile financial system, it will share its global responsibilities as it eventually joins the G7. The paper wraps up by placing the exchange issue in the broader context and discussing the longerterm prospects of the RMB. Is the RMB Undervalued? The RMB is undervalued in the conventional sense that there is too much demand for it relative to the supply .Fundamentally, demand for foreign currency es from three sources: ? to buy goods or services, ? to invest in physical or financial assets, and ? to speculate on moves of the exchange rate itself. With a closed capital account, China’s currency is largely, but not entirely, immune from currency speculators and shortterm portfolio investors. Recent studies at the China National Economic Research Institute (2020) indicate that much of the socalled “hot money” inflows are not a result of foreign hedge fund activities. Rather, they are a change in borrowing and deposit behaviors of domestic firms and individuals, taking advantage of the loopholes in the current foreign exchange regulations. Thus, we can focus our attention on the trade and long term investment flows in China and look at the standard measures, such as purchasi