【正文】 behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also Fundamental attribution error), and for explanations of one39。s preconceptions.[14] ? Congruence bias – the tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses. ? Conjunction fallacy – the tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general ones.[15] ? Conservatism or regressive bias – tendency to underestimate high values and high likelihoods/probabilities/frequencies and overestimate low ones. Based on the observed evidence, estimates are not extreme enough[16][17][18] ? Conservatism (Bayesian) – the tendency to revise belief insufficiently when presented with new evidence (estimates of conditional probabilities are conservative)[16][19][20] ? Contrast effect – the enhancement or diminishing of a weight or other measurement when pared with a recently observed contrasting object.[21] ? Curse of knowledge – when knowledge of a topic diminishes one39。 p= p= ， p= p= p= p=是相同的。 ? 心理學(xué)上把這種 由于不一樣表達(dá)導(dǎo)致不一樣結(jié)果的現(xiàn)象稱為“框架效應(yīng)” 。 ?人們對(duì)損失和獲得的敏感程度是不同的，損失的痛苦要遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于獲得的快樂，即“損失規(guī)避” (loss aversion)。 ? 多數(shù)人對(duì)得失的判斷往往根據(jù)參照點(diǎn)決定，舉例來說，在“其他人一年掙 6萬元你年收入 7萬元”和“其他人年收入為 9萬元你一年收入 8萬”的選擇題中，大部分人會(huì)選擇前者。為了評(píng)估決策需要，人們通常在第一階段對(duì)事件進(jìn)行預(yù)處理，包括數(shù)據(jù)的整合、簡(jiǎn)化，但是不同的整合、簡(jiǎn)化方法會(huì)得到不同的事件及其組合，并導(dǎo)致人的非理性行為和 框架依賴效應(yīng) ，即人對(duì)同一問題的最后決策的不一致。 ? Savage(1954)提出主觀期望效用 (Subjective Expected Utility, SEU)最大化理論， 認(rèn)為決策備擇方案的選擇遵循主觀效用最大化原則。 ? 第一組賭局： ? 賭局 A： 100％的機(jī)會(huì)得到 100萬元。 附： “埃爾斯伯格悖論” (Ellsberg paradox) ? 埃爾斯伯格（ Ellsberg， 1961）進(jìn)行了如下的博彩實(shí)驗(yàn)。 ? (3)Kahneman和 Tversky(1979)引入系統(tǒng)的非傳遞性和不連續(xù)性的概念，以解決優(yōu)勢(shì)違背問題，即前景理論； EU理論的修正 2 ? (4)“后悔”的概念被引入，以解釋共同比率效應(yīng)和偏好的非傳遞性；如 Loomes和 Sudgen（ 1982）所提出的“后悔模型”引入了一種后悔函數(shù)，將效用奠定在個(gè)體對(duì)過去“不選擇”結(jié)果的心理體驗(yàn)上（放棄選擇后出現(xiàn)不佳結(jié)果感到慶幸，放棄選擇后出現(xiàn)更佳結(jié)果感到后悔），對(duì)預(yù)期效用函數(shù)進(jìn)行了改寫（仍然保持了線性特征）。稱之為 “確定效應(yīng)” 。 二、反射效果 (reflection effect) ? 1）在下命兩個(gè)博彩間進(jìn)行選擇： ?博彩 A：肯定贏 1000元 。 三、分離效應(yīng) (isolation effect) ? 考慮一個(gè)兩階段的博彩：在博彩第一階段，個(gè)人有 75%的概率出局得不到任何回報(bào)，只有 25%人進(jìn)入下個(gè)階段；第二階段，在下面兩個(gè)博彩間進(jìn)行選擇： ?博彩 A： 80%的機(jī)會(huì)得到 4000元； ?博彩 B： 100%的機(jī)會(huì)得到 3000元。 （ 78%） 價(jià)值函數(shù) (Value Function) ? Kahneman和 Tversky(1979)給出的價(jià)值函數(shù)的指數(shù)形式如下： ? 其中： α和 β分別表示收益和損失區(qū)域價(jià)值冪函數(shù)的凹凸程度 。 ? （ 3） 決策權(quán)重傾向于高估小概率事件（ π(p) ＞ P ）和低估高概率事件（ π(p) ＜ P ），即很不可能的事情卻被賦予了很多的權(quán)重，很有可能的事情卻被賦予低的權(quán)重；在中間階段人們對(duì)概率的變化不敏感。s own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as 99% certain turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.[16][48][49][50] ? Pareidolia – a vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant, ., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the moon, and hearing nonexistent hidden messages on records played in reverse. ? Pessimism bias – the tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them. ? Planning fallacy – the tendency to underestimate taskpletion times.[38] ? Postpurchase rationalization – the tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was a good value. ? Proinnovation bias – the tendency to reflect a personal bias towards an invention/innovation, while often failing to identify limitations and weaknesses or address the possibility of failure. ? Pseudocertainty effect – the tendency to make riskaverse choices if the expected oute is positive, but make riskseeking choices to avoid negative outes.[51] Decisionmaking, belief and behavioral biases (7/8) ? Reactance – the urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice (see also Reverse psychology). ? Reactive devaluation – devaluing proposals that are no longer hypothetical or purportedly originated with an adversary. ? Recency bias – a cognitive bias that results from disproportionate salience attributed to recent stimuli or observations – the tendency to weigh recent events more than earlier events (see also peakend rule, recency effect). ? Recency illusion – the illusion that a phenomenon, typically a word or language usage, that one has just begun to notice is a recent innovation (see also frequency illusion). ? Restraint bias – the tendency to overestimate one39。s future selves) share one39。s own strong partisan views. ? Hothand fallacy The hothand fallacy (also known as the hot hand phenomenon or hot hand) is the fallacious belief that a person who has experienced success has a greater chance of further success in additional attempts ? Hyperbolic discounting – the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs, where the tendency increases the closer to the present both payoffs are.[34] Also known as current moment bias, presentbias, and related to Dynamic inconsistency. ? Illusion of control – the tendency to overestimate one39。 ? 決策權(quán)重函數(shù)具有以下特點(diǎn)： ? （ 1）決策權(quán)重不是概率，它并不符合概率公理。 （ 28%） ? 情景二：對(duì)第二組被試（ N=155）敘述同樣的情景，同時(shí)將解決方案改為 C和 D： ? 如果采用 C方案， 400人將死去。 ? 博彩 D： 50%可能性損失 2023元， 50%可能性什么也不損失。根據(jù)期望效用理論有： U(C) U(D)。 確定效應(yīng) 損失規(guī)避 參照依賴 反射效應(yīng) 迷戀小概率事件 前景理論 PT理論的基本原理 PT理論的基本原理 ? 在《賭客信條》一書中，作者孫惟微將前景理論歸納為 5句話： ? “二鳥在林，不如一鳥在手”，在確定的收益和“賭一把”之間，多數(shù)人會(huì)選擇確定的好處。該類模型的特點(diǎn)是針對(duì)同結(jié)果效應(yīng)和同比率效應(yīng)等，放松期望效用函數(shù)的線性特征，或?qū)砘僭O(shè)進(jìn)行重新表述，模型將用概率三角形表示的期望效用函數(shù)線性特征的無差異曲線，擴(kuò)展成體現(xiàn)局部線性近似的扇行展開。（即人的效用函數(shù)往往低估一些只具有可能性的結(jié)果，而相對(duì) 高估 確定性的結(jié)果。 ? 第二組賭局： ? 賭局 C： 11％的機(jī)會(huì)得到 100萬元， 89％的機(jī)會(huì)什么也得不到。那么，該隨機(jī)變量給他的效用便是： EU理論的質(zhì)疑 ? EU理論及 SEU理論描述了 “理性人” 在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)條件下的決策行為。編輯階段之后，決策者對(duì)期望進(jìn)行估值并進(jìn)行選擇。 一、確定效果 (certainty effect) ? 1）在下面兩個(gè)博彩間進(jìn)行選擇： ? 博彩 A： 33%的機(jī)會(huì)得到 2500元， 66%的機(jī)會(huì)得到2400元， 1%的機(jī)會(huì)什么也得不到；