【正文】 internal controls. Our results indicate that more active audit mittees are associated with reporting internal control weaknesses. Given that position and not activity is governed by SOX, variation in the latter assumes more importance. This suggests that examining effective governance in the postSOX period likely involves more emphasis on the activity of the mittees than simply their does not mean position is irrelevant, results also indicate that mittees with a smaller proportion of financial experts are more likely to report internal control weaknesses. We view this result as supporting the importance placed on ‘financial expertise’ in SOX and also that expertise requirements should be viewed more broadly than the simple nomination of one member to satisfy the requirements of stock exchanges. With respect to the auditor variables (size and tenure), the results are not significant with the exception of auditor changes. Companies that report material weaknesses report more auditor changes than panies that do not report such weaknesses. Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, we examine a small sample during a short time period in the postSOX era when the focus and attention on internal control reporting have been enormous. Second, as noted in the introduction, our design is subject to the assumption that our sample firms have internal control weaknesses and report them while our control firms do not have weaknesses and as such do not report any weaknesses. A longer time period and a larger sample may be needed to tease out the effects of auditrelated variables such as audit tenure. As noted in the introduction, the causes and consequences of reporting and remedying internal control weaknesses may be more plex than the governance mechanisms considered in this study. In particular, the number of audit mittee meetings and the proportions of experts in audit mittees may have been undergoing significant changes during the time period studied because of heightened awareness of financial reporting issues. Our interpretation of results on the association between internal control weaknesses and governance mechanisms has to be viewed in this context. Future research can examine whether the causes and consequences of control weaknesses are identifiable with specific changes in governance mechanisms such as changes in proportion of accounting experts. A longer time series data would enable researchers to study whether, for example, a decrease in the proportion of experts leads to increased likelihood of reporting internal control weaknesses. We view our findings as preliminary in nature and future research could extend our study by examining a larger and a multiperiod sample. Source:Gopal V. Krishnan and Gnanakumar Internal Control Deficiencies in the PostSarbanesOxley Era:The Role of Auditors and Corporate Governance[J].International Journal of Auditing,2020, :7390. 譯文： 后薩班斯時代的內(nèi)部控制缺陷報告：審計人員與公司治理的作用 本研究解決了在通過薩班斯法案（ SOX）之后審計委員會及審計師在內(nèi)部控制缺陷報告中的作用。根據(jù)薩班斯法案 404 條款，我們研究公司的內(nèi)部控制報告的缺陷和這些公司的審計委員會及審計師的特點。雖然在這次研究當(dāng)中，我們已經(jīng)證實了有些公司在內(nèi)部控制報告中根本沒有發(fā)布任何弱點，而有一些公司出具內(nèi)部控制報告之后，又在報告中補(bǔ)充披露了控制方面的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)?？死锼辜{（ 2020）推測企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制報告缺陷在薩班斯法案頒布之前時期，與報告缺陷不同的公司相比，審計委員會越小，就不具獨立性，更不具專業(yè)性。此前的審計文獻(xiàn)（例如阿博特等 2020）發(fā)現(xiàn)，審計委員會的效率與委員會的規(guī)模是正相關(guān)的?？死锼辜{和福斯那瑟（ 2020 年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，有財務(wù)專家的審計委員會，事務(wù)所對其財務(wù)報告會更保守。因 為有關(guān)規(guī)定在指定一個人作為大多數(shù)公司審計委員會專家的結(jié)果時，各公司之間對專業(yè)知識來說只有非常小的變化 .然而，如果專業(yè)知識真正重要，則必須考慮到專家人數(shù)和審計委員會的規(guī)模來獲取審計委員會財務(wù)方面的專業(yè)知識在企業(yè)之間的變化。無論如何，這并不意味著這是無關(guān)緊要的成分。需要花更長的時間和找更多的樣本才能梳理出審計效果和審計相關(guān)的變量的影