股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績(jī)效研究畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文參考資料及譯文(完整版)
【正文】 find that the results from this piecewise regression are not robust to a substitution of accounting profit rate for Tobin’s . Demsetz, B. VillalongarJournal of Corporate Finance 7 (2021) 209–233 211 Other articles have followed the Morck et al. ?1988. study. Included among these are McConnell and Servaes ?1990., Hermalin and Weisbach ?1988., Loderer and Martin ?1997., Cho ?1998., Himmelberg et al. ?1999., and Holderness et .. Summary descriptions of these studies are provided in Appendix A. All rely chiefly on Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance, although a few also examine accounting profit rate, and all emphasize managerial shareholdings as a measure of ownership structure. Differences abound across these studies, in measurements and sample used, in estimating technique applied, in whether and how they account for the endogeneity of ownership structure, and in results obtained. Fig. 1 shows the results of all the studies of firm performance and ownership structure that followed Demsetz and Lehn ?1985..2 We do not judge here which of these articles offer?s. the most reliable guide. However, Fig. 1 suggests that these studies, viewed in totality, do not give strong evidence by which to reject the belief that firm performance and managerial equity ownership are unrelated. In Section 2, we analyze the conceptual issues surrounding each of the threemain aspects that seem to explain the differences in results observed acrossstudies: The measurements of firm performance, the measure of ownership structure used, and whether or not the endogeneity of ownership structure is taken into account in the estimation of the effect of ownership on performance. Our analysis suggests that none of the studies we examine treat ownership structure appropriately. It should be modeled not only as an endogenous variable but also, simultaneously, as an amalgam of shareholdings owned by persons with differentinterests. In particular, the fractions of shares owned by outside shareholders and by management should be measured separately. To our knowledge, no study to date incorporates both these aspects of ownership Hence, a restudy of the ownership–performance relation seems needed. Our restudy fills this gap. It models ownership structure as an endogenous variable and it examines two dimensions of this structure likely to represent conflicting interests, the fraction of shares owned by management and the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholding interests. For the 223 firm sample examined here, the evidence supports the belief that ownership structure is endogenous but not the belief that ownership structure affects firm performance. The Demsetz and Lehn results are not shown in Fig. 1 because they are based on different measures of profit and ownership structure than are the results portrayed in Fig. The studies that take the endogeneity of ownership into account to some degree include Demsetz and Lehn ?1985., Hermalin and Weisbach ?1991., Loderer and Martin ?1997., Cho ?1998., and Himmelberg et al. ?1999.. Holderness et al. ?1999. confirm the endogeneity of insider ownership but do not account for it in their estimation of the ownership–performance relation. None of these studies consider more than one measure of owne
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