【正文】 five postadoption years relative to the year prior to adoption. The use of valuebased management systems is associated with improved economic performance for a sustained period. Source: Harley , Emery ,2020.“Corporate Financial Control Mechanisms and Firm Performance: The Case of ValueBased Management Systems”. Forthing in the Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,September,. 譯文： 財務(wù)控制 有效的公司治理和財務(wù)控制 ， 包括使用監(jiān)控和激勵機制來調(diào)整股東和管理者之間的不同利益關(guān)系，鼓勵股東價值的創(chuàng)造。另外， 管理者可以通過簽訂一個基于 VBM 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的報酬合同， 讓公司績 效達(dá)到一定的水平， 從本質(zhì)上保證獎金支付。在控制可能樣本的選擇性偏差后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)大公司比小公司提高較少。這些支出的減少沒有因企業(yè)發(fā)展機會 的 不同而不同。它們提供了 一個將管理者決策與創(chuàng)造股東價值的公司績效 相 聯(lián)系的 機制，并且 提供了一種進一步協(xié)調(diào)股東權(quán)益和管理者利益的手段。 我們從大量發(fā)表的文章中認(rèn)識到四種不同的 VBM 度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。馬登（ 1999） 對 CFROI 進行了 詳細(xì) 的論述 。 大多數(shù)現(xiàn)有的實證研究， 經(jīng)常是由實行基于價值管理體系的咨詢公司所發(fā)起的，其注重指標(biāo)（或價值因素）與 股東價值之間的聯(lián)系 。這些特征可以讓我們?nèi)ヌ剿?VBM 更為廣泛的運用 , 還能 揭示內(nèi)源性決策過程?；趦r值的管理系統(tǒng)試圖 通過為管理者提供一套決策工具來達(dá)到這一目標(biāo) ，用其來 確定哪些選擇 可以 創(chuàng)造 或 損壞 價值，并經(jīng)常 將報酬 和 升職 與股東價值 的 衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 相聯(lián)系。具有較高運營資本水平的公司也較不傾向于將報酬與 VBM 相聯(lián)系。總體來說，適合公司調(diào)整的剩余收益在采用 VBM 后的五年均比使用前的剩余收益要高。雖然咨詢公司常常宣傳自己獨特的 VBM 業(yè)績指標(biāo)，但我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn) 任何 證據(jù)表明這個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)比其他的要好。當(dāng) VBM 被用于報酬或當(dāng)公司采用或高或低的資本支出，成長機會或投資于運營資本時， VBM 似乎沒有多少的效果。其次，我們使用特定年份的基于法定稅率的不同稅率與所有年度不變的稅率進行比較。科普蘭的論點強調(diào)了對 VBM系統(tǒng)的使用和改善股票價格 間關(guān)系的測試難度。斯特恩我們不使用任何給定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來代表可能已將該種方法推廣的咨詢公司的作用。 商業(yè)界 也表現(xiàn)了這種利益關(guān)系 。最終，股東將承受這一損失。這影響在兩年后的統(tǒng)計中不是很顯著。通過與在行業(yè)，以前的業(yè)績和規(guī)模方面相當(dāng)?shù)墓具M行比較，發(fā)現(xiàn)公司采用 VBM 體系后 的 5 年的剩余收益比采用之前有所增加。為了深入認(rèn)識這個問題 ， 我們調(diào)查了從 1984年到 1997年采用 VBM 系統(tǒng)的 84 個公司 ，由此 來說明 VBM 系統(tǒng) 的作用和經(jīng)濟效益。原文 ： Financial Control Effective corporate governance and financial control includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to align divergent interests between shareholders and managers and encourage the creation of shareholder value. Valuebased management systems (VBM) provide an integrated management strategy and financial control system intended to increase shareholder value by mitigating agency conflicts. In concept, VBM reduces agency conflicts and helps create shareholder value since it reveals valueincreasing decisions to employees, allows for easier monitoring of managers’ decisions, and provides a method to tie pensation to outes that create shareholder value. However, the degree to which VBM systems actually improve the economic performance of publicly held firms is an open question. To gain insight into this issue, we examine the use and economic efficacy of valuebased management systems by 84 firms that adopt VBM systems from 1984 to 1997. We investigate two related research questions: (1) Does the adoption of a VBM system improve economic performance? And (2) What factors enhance or hinder the effectiveness of VBM systems? Our primary goal is to examine whether the adoption of a VBM system improves economic performance. We recognize that firm performance and the decision to tie pensation to a VBM metric can be endogenous, which creates a potential sample selection bias. For instance, firms that are performing poorly face tougher challenges to creating economic value and could be more likely to tie pensation to VBM to provide managers the incentives to overe these challenges. Alternatively, managers who expect to achieve a certain level of performance can negotiate a pensation contract based on the VBM metric that essentially assures a bonus payout. Our sample includes firms that base pensation on VBM metrics, but also firms that use VBM for analysis and evaluation only. Thus, we can examine why firms choose to tie pensation to VBM, which allows us to control for potential sample selection bias that results from endogenous relations between pensation plans and firm performance. With regard to our first research question, we find t