【正文】 owth firms, suggesting that the improvement in residual ine does not e at the expense of longterm value. With regard to our second research question, we find that firm size is the only firm specific characteristic that relates to the effectiveness of VBM in all years. After controlling for possible sample selection bias, we find that large firms show less improvement than small firms. We note, however, that these regressions have low adjusted R2s. Possibly, this result suggests that larger firms face greater monitoring costs, which make it more difficult to implement programs in larger firms. In our multivariate analysis, we also find that (i) firms that perform better prior to adoption are more likely to tie pensation to VBM and (ii) the post adoption adjusted performance in the first two years after adoption negatively relates to the use of VBM to determine pensation. This effect is not statistically significant after two years. It is possible that firms that already focus on value creation are more likely to tie VBM to pensation and that these firms simply have less potential for improvement. Alternatively, firms might cap bonus payouts too low when they implement plans, which reduces initial efficacy. We also find that firms reduce capital expenditures following VBM adoption. These reductions in spending do not differ based on the firms’ growth opportunities. Thus, the improvement in performance does not appear to e at the expense of longterm value. Overall, our results provide support that valuebased management systems are effective mechanisms for improving corporate performance. The literature on property rights (., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and agency theory (., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) maintains that different incentives lead to conflicts between shareholders and managers of the public firm that result in a loss in firm value. Ultimately, the shareholders bear this loss. Valuebased management provides an integrated management strategy and financial control system designed to mitigate these agency conflicts and increase shareholder value. VBM systems attempt to acplish this goal by providing managers with a set of decisionmaking tools that, at least in theory, identify which alternatives create or destroy value, and often by linking pensation and promotions to shareholder value. Firms can use these metrics to monitor and reward management performance. They provide a mechanism for linking managers’ decisions to firm performance outes that create shareholder value and provide a means to further align shareholder and managerial interests. Valuebased management has captured the interest of the corporate and investment munities. Ryan and Trahan (1999) report that 87 percent of 86 CFOs surveyed indicate that they are familiar with valuebased management. Most of these CFOs also indicate that their firm uses one or more VBM systems. This interest has also been demonstrated in the business press. Articles in Fortune (., Stires, 2020。通過與在行業(yè)，以前的業(yè)績和規(guī)模方面相當(dāng)?shù)墓具M行比較，發(fā)現(xiàn)公司采用 VBM 體系后 的 5 年的剩余收益比采用之前有所增加。最終，股東將承受這一損失。我們不使用任何給定的標(biāo)準來代表可能已將該種方法推廣的咨詢公司的作用?？破仗m的論點強調(diào)了對 VBM系統(tǒng)的使用和改善股票價格 間關(guān)系的測試難度。當(dāng) VBM 被用于報酬或當(dāng)公司采用或高或低的資本支出，成長機會或投資于運營資本時， VBM 似乎沒有多少的效果。總體來說，適合公司調(diào)整的剩余收益在采用 VBM 后的五年均比使用前的剩余收益要高?；趦r值的管理系統(tǒng)試圖 通過為管理者提供一套決策工具來達到這一目標(biāo) ，用其來 確定哪些選擇 可以 創(chuàng)造 或 損壞 價值，并經(jīng)常 將報酬 和 升職 與股東價值 的 衡量標(biāo)準 相聯(lián)系。 大多數(shù)現(xiàn)有的實證研究， 經(jīng)常是由實行基于價值管理體系的咨詢公司所發(fā)起的，其注重指標(biāo)（或價值因素）與 股東價值之間的聯(lián)系 。 我們從大量發(fā)表的文章中認識到四種不同的 VBM 度量標(biāo)準。這些支出的減少沒有因企業(yè)發(fā)展機會 的 不同而不同。另外， 管理者可以通過簽訂一個基于 VBM 標(biāo)準的報酬合同， 讓公司績 效達到一定的水平， 從本質(zhì)上保證獎金支付?；趦r值的管理體系（ VBM）提供了一個綜合管理戰(zhàn)略和財務(wù)控制體系，意圖通過減少代理沖突來增加股東價值。我們注意到，這些線性回歸 不管怎樣都 具有較小的