【正文】 我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，在頭兩年采用VBM 的企業(yè)業(yè)績 改善與報酬呈負(fù)相關(guān)。 我們的方法有三個額外貢獻(xiàn)。可以見科普蘭等人（ 2020）對 ROIC 更為詳細(xì)的論述。賴安和 特拉漢 （ 1999）指出 ：在 86 位被調(diào)查的首席財務(wù)官中 ， 有 87%表示他們熟悉基于價值管理 的體系 。這結(jié)果表明大公司可能面臨較大的監(jiān)控成本，這使其在大公司落實程序較困難。自揭示雇員價值逐漸增長的決策以來， VBM 在理念上 減少了代理沖突且?guī)椭鷦?chuàng)造了股東價值，使管理決策的監(jiān)控變得簡單，并且提供了一種將報酬與產(chǎn)出掛鉤的方法來創(chuàng)造股東價值。例如，業(yè)績較差的公司在經(jīng)濟(jì)價值創(chuàng)造上面臨 著 更艱巨的挑戰(zhàn)，其更傾向于將報酬與 VBM 聯(lián)系 ，從而 給管理者激勵， 來克服這些困難。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)公司采用 VBM 后減少了資本性支出。這些文章剖析了采納多種管理 系統(tǒng)的幾家企業(yè)，基于不同 VBM 標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，通過各種努力來增加它們的價值。 盡管所提供的基于價值管理的技術(shù)和其廣泛的應(yīng)用受到關(guān)注，但我們沒有足夠的證據(jù)證明其有能力改善公司的 績效 。 有效的公司治理和財務(wù)控制 ， 包括使用監(jiān)控和激勵機(jī)制來 鼓勵股東價值的創(chuàng)造。 總之，我們的分析表明 VBM 產(chǎn)生了經(jīng)濟(jì) 效益 的改善。我們沒有找到任何證據(jù)表明剩余收益的增加是 以犧牲長期投資為代價的。 我們的樣本選擇方法使我們 的 研究區(qū)別于以前的研究。 我們提供了四個 度量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，總結(jié)如下： （ 1）現(xiàn)金流量貼現(xiàn)（ DCF） —— 現(xiàn)金流折現(xiàn)法 ，比如股東價值 增加值 （ SVA），表示在公司資本成本的基礎(chǔ)上將預(yù)計未來現(xiàn)金流量折合到現(xiàn)在的價值?；趦r值的管理提供了一個可以減輕這些機(jī)構(gòu)沖突和增加股東價值的綜合管理戰(zhàn)略和財務(wù)控制系統(tǒng)。在我們的樣本中，在行業(yè)與業(yè)績處于平均水平的公司 ， 自采用 VBM 體系 后的 5 年中投資回報率上升了 7 個百分點。原文 ： Financial Control Effective corporate governance and financial control includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to align divergent interests between shareholders and managers and encourage the creation of shareholder value. Valuebased management systems (VBM) provide an integrated management strategy and financial control system intended to increase shareholder value by mitigating agency conflicts. In concept, VBM reduces agency conflicts and helps create shareholder value since it reveals valueincreasing decisions to employees, allows for easier monitoring of managers’ decisions, and provides a method to tie pensation to outes that create shareholder value. However, the degree to which VBM systems actually improve the economic performance of publicly held firms is an open question. To gain insight into this issue, we examine the use and economic efficacy of valuebased management systems by 84 firms that adopt VBM systems from 1984 to 1997. We investigate two related research questions: (1) Does the adoption of a VBM system improve economic performance? And (2) What factors enhance or hinder the effectiveness of VBM systems? Our primary goal is to examine whether the adoption of a VBM system improves economic performance. We recognize that firm performance and the decision to tie pensation to a VBM metric can be endogenous, which creates a potential sample selection bias. For instance, firms that are performing poorly face tougher challenges to creating economic value and could be more likely to tie pensation to VBM to provide managers the incentives to overe these challenges. Alternatively, managers who expect to achieve a certain level of performance can negotiate a pensation contract based on the VBM metric that essentially assures a bonus payout. Our sample includes firms that base pensation on VBM metrics, but also firms that use VBM for analysis and evaluation only. Thus, we can examine why firms choose to tie pensation to VBM, which allows us to control for potential sample selection bias that results from endogenous relations between pensation plans and firm performance. With regard to our first research question, we find that firm performance increases following the adoption of valuebased management systems. Compared to a matched firm based on industry, prior performance, and size, firms that adopt VBM systems increase residual ine for the five years subsequent to the adoption of a VBM system relative to the year before adoption. The median firm in our sample increases industry and performanceadjusted residual ine divided by invested capital by over 7 percentage points for the fiveyear period subsequent to VBM adoption. We do not find evidence that VBM encourages underinvestment in highgr