【正文】 以產生積極的外部性，如果該系統(tǒng)是價格便宜，即 GDP的一部分分配給退休一代并不大。這些功能源于同時在技術內容上的應用 退休金制度，而不是從系統(tǒng)本身。因此，在部分二論文中，我們會研究如何波蘭現在已經成功實施的辦法列于論文的第一部分，并建立了一個強大的和中立的根本養(yǎng)老保險制度。這并不意味著如某些人承擔放棄社會安全目標。然而，很少有國家能夠在引進根本性的改革面積到了這個時候養(yǎng)老金。在人口結構的變化觀察到，在過去的一夫妻幾十年，這歷史性的嘗試，以穩(wěn)定為首占 GDP的比重為退 休人員嚴重的財政問題和經濟增長負外部性，如觀察許多國家。 ? Splitting each person’s OA contributions between two accounts (first account – NDC, second account – FDC)。附錄一 原文 Reintroducing Intergenerational Equilibrium: Key Concepts behind the New Polish Pension System Abstract Poland adopted a new pension system in 1999. This new pension system allows Poland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing it as is projected for the majority of other OECD countries. This paper presents the conceptual background of the new system design. The new system’s longterm bjective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographic situation. This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocated to the entire retired generation. Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share of GDP per retiree. The change in demographic structure observed over the past for a couple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree led to severe fiscal problems and negative externalities for growth, as observed in numerous countries. Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems in different ways to try to resolve the issue of these everincreasing costs. Although the Polish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design differs from the typical approaches – and the lessons and results are promising for all OECD countries. This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of this alternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension system design. Introduction Demographic transition together with myopic policies has caused severe problems in the area of pensions in many countries around the world. Elements of traditional pension systems’ design include a weak link of benefits to contributions and the lack of control over costs of the system. Inclusion of these elements in the pension system design led to the explosion of costs, caused negative externalities for growth and contributed to persistently high unemployment. As such, the quest for pension reform is now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially 2 in Europe. However, very few countries have been able to introduce fundamental reforms in the area of pensions to this time. In this case, the definition of reform is crucial. For the purposes of this paper, “reform” means changing the system in order to remove tructural inefficiencies – and not just playing at the margins with contribution rates and retirement ages to adjust the system’s parameters for shortterm fiscal and political pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies with social security. At the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by a lack of consensus on what could replace the traditional system. Discussions on this issue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discussion participants, as well as from overuse of such concepts as “payasyougo” versus “funding”, or “public” versus “private”, while at the same time ignoring a number of important