【正文】 表明股權(quán)高度集中。它是衡量公司價(jià)值的一個(gè)重要指標(biāo)，是公司進(jìn)行經(jīng)營(yíng)管理活動(dòng)的目標(biāo)。委托人為了防止代理人損害自己的利益，保證代理人能夠盡心盡力的為公司利益最大化服務(wù)，企業(yè)就必須建立一套有效的激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制。股東無(wú)法通過(guò)剩余控制權(quán)來(lái)保證自己的剩余索取權(quán)，就通過(guò)授予或剝奪經(jīng)營(yíng)者的控制權(quán)以及調(diào)節(jié)對(duì)控制權(quán)的制約程度來(lái)激勵(lì)和約束經(jīng)營(yíng)者的行為。第三章 中小板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)及成因分析中小企業(yè)板塊使用的基本制度規(guī)范與現(xiàn)有市場(chǎng)完全相同，中小企業(yè)板塊適用的發(fā)行上市標(biāo)準(zhǔn)也與現(xiàn)有主板市場(chǎng)完全相同，其目的是為那些主業(yè)突出、具有成長(zhǎng)性和科技含量的中小企業(yè)提供直接融資平臺(tái)。中小板新上市公司比重大，受大小非解禁的影響新發(fā)行股票的發(fā)起人股不能立即流通，這樣非流通股比例就比較為成熟的主板上市公司高。假設(shè)二：股權(quán)制衡度與公司績(jī)效存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系。一方面，大多數(shù)中小企業(yè)板上市公司高級(jí)管理者也是企業(yè)的實(shí)際控制人，管理者利益與企業(yè)主利益與公司利益相同，管理層持股比例越高實(shí)際控制人對(duì)企業(yè)的控制能力就越強(qiáng)，公司經(jīng)營(yíng)效率越高；另一方面，在股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制下，公司會(huì)向高管人員授予一定的股票期權(quán)，將其工作效率與公司的股票市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)掛鉤，將高管人員個(gè)人利益與公司利益捆綁在一起，管理者持股增加，公司績(jī)效對(duì)其個(gè)人收入的影響也就越大，為了自身利益最大化，管理者將提高決策效率，努力增加企業(yè)收入降低企業(yè)成本，提高公司效益。赫芬達(dá)爾指數(shù)，是指公司前n位大股東持股比例的平方和，本文選取前五大股東持股比例的平方和，記為HD5，其值越大說(shuō)明股權(quán)集中度越高。從管理層持股比例看，中小企業(yè)板上市公司管理層持股比例最大值能達(dá)到78%左右，%，這與主板上市公司相比是比較高的。股權(quán)制衡有利于避免公司控股股東獨(dú)裁，提高公司決策的效率；大股東的多元化，可以提高對(duì)經(jīng)理人員的監(jiān)督效率，由于利益驅(qū)使大股東都會(huì)關(guān)注經(jīng)營(yíng)者決策；股權(quán)制衡、大股東多元化，股東間的相互監(jiān)督，可以降低控制權(quán)私人收益避免掠奪掏空行為，從而提升公司價(jià)值。從實(shí)證結(jié)果還可以看出，公司規(guī)模與公司績(jī)效呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，規(guī)模越大績(jī)效越高，資產(chǎn)規(guī)模大可以形成規(guī)模效應(yīng)，降低營(yíng)運(yùn)成本，擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)占有率，提高公司績(jī)效。（三）股權(quán)集中對(duì)公司績(jī)效有良好的影響，可以減少小股東“搭便車”現(xiàn)象，提高股東對(duì)公司的監(jiān)督效率，有利于公司發(fā)展。在我國(guó)國(guó)有控股也僅限于關(guān)系國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈的行業(yè)企業(yè)，國(guó)家對(duì)此類企業(yè)控股有利于維護(hù)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定。在數(shù)據(jù)、資料的收集中，在論文多次的修改中，心情是復(fù)雜的，但此刻更多的是喜悅。Becht and Roell,1999).Consequently ,the potential expropriation of the minority investors by the controlling owners became the main concern(Johnson et al.,2000,Faccio and Lang,2002。附 錄AOwnership concentration and firm performance:Evidence from an emerging marketBy: Irena GrosfeldAbstractThe initial view of the advantages of ownership concentration in joint stock panies was determined by the concern about the opportunistic managerial behavior. The growing importance of knowledge and human capital in the operation of firms shifts the focus of concern: excessive ownership concentration may stifle managerial may be particularly true, and the results obtained in this paper support this hypothesis, in firms with high share of knowledge related activities. I explore the determinants of ownership concentration and the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in the context of a transition economy, . an economy undergoing important changes in its legal and regulatory framework, in macroeconomic policy and most of all, in its property rights allocation. I focus on all nonfinancial panies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange since its inception in 1991 up to 2003. The ownership structure of these panies bees more dispersed with the number of years of listing. The results give support to the hypothesis that firms belonging to the sector of high technology have lower ownership concentration than firms in more ‘mature’ industries. The positive impact of ownership concentration on firm value detected in OLS regressions bees even stronger when we control for the endogeneity of ownership.Keywords : Ownership structure, corporate governance, uncertainty, knowledgeeconomyWhat are the characteristics of‘good’ownership structure?Does ownership structure matter for firm performance?Why certain firms have large block holders and others do not?Should the power of large shareholders be limited to avoid expropriation or enc ouraged to curb managerial discretion?These questions have been largely explored in corporate finance literature and we understand better now the intricacies of the relationship between ownership structure and firmperformance.But empirical evidence on the impact of shareholders with significant equity holdings oncorporate performance remains authors using different samples of firms and different empirical strategies obtain different,difficult to pare and sometimes contradictory is increasingly recognized that the problem in disentangling this relationship is largely due to the pervasive endogeneity of ownership which has to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased the existing empirical evidence also suggests that the relationship between ownership and performance may depend on the type of the firm and on the period of observation in the life of the firm.The purpose of this paper is to explore more in details the determinants of ownership concentration and the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in the context of an economy undergoing important changes in its legal and regulatory frame work,in macroeconomic policy and most of all,in its property rights a panel of firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange(WSE)offers an unusual opportunity for this kind of investigation.The Polish economy was exposed to radical institutional changes in the strategy in Poland was strongly influenced by the willingness to create appropriate ownership structure in privatized firms, ensure that powerful block holders control the large portion of stateowned enterprises was privatized and the conditions for entry of new firms were signific antly of the privatized and newly created firms have entered the stock exchange established in firms are likely to show a lot of ownership structure is likely to be determined by the firm origin and for privatized firms by the method of firms,when they bee listed on the stock exchange are likely to have,at least during the initial years of listing,more concentrated ownership structure than privatized ,new firms established by their founders in a market friendly environment may require less ownership,financial and industrial restructuring than previously stateowned enterprises.The sensitivity of firm performance to firm ownership structure is likely to vary across may also undergo important changes over firms are listed on the stock exchange,reallocation of ownership stakes bees greatly first part of this paper is devoted to the exploration of the determinants of ownership to understand why certain firms have large owners and others have dispersed ownership structure,I build on the extant literature and notably on Demsetz and Lehn (1985)and Himmelberg et al.(1999).The contribution of my paper to the literature consists in taking into account the importance of knowledge related activities.The idea is that