財(cái)務(wù)管理---責(zé)任管理模式(存儲(chǔ)版)
【正文】 ? The difference between the two ($754) represents the maximum amount to pay for an information system to reveal the agent’s effort. ? The middle, 2nd best solution (incentive patible contract) may not always be the next best thing though! 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 24 Let’s say that we set the two variables, R55 and R40, to be 18,769 and 11,449 respectively. Effort level Expected utility of the agent E1=6 (18,769189。)189。 = 100 E3=4 (18,769189。() 36 ? R55189。Φ40(e3) – e32 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 21 Incentive Compatible Contract – Specific Solutions Maximize (55,000 – R55) + (40,000R40) Subject to: R55189。Φ40(e1) e12 = 100 R55189。 42 = 112 Is it likely to have the “adverse selection” problem? How about the “moral hazard” problem? And, the horizon problem? Residual loss? 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 17 What can we say, up to this point? ? Under condition of unobservability (inplete information), fixed payments to agents (. workers, employees) most likely do not work. ? What are then the alternatives? ? We can give the principal a fixed payment instead. ? Or, we can e up with an “incentive patible” conditional contract. 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 18 Fixed Payment to the Principal Consider this new contract under which the principal gets $32,750 no matter what happens and the agent keeps the rest. Will this work? Effort level Expected payoff to the agent E1=6 [(55,000189。 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 9 誰(shuí)是代理人？什么是代理成本？ ? An agent is someone who has certain special expertise that is desired by the principal to use for his/her benefits. The agent is usually risk adverse, has decision rights to manage, but does not own, the anization’s assets. 代理人 (agent) 是任何人在公司有決策權(quán)力，但是并非產(chǎn)權(quán)的最終所有者。但是如果你有大病的話，很可能保險(xiǎn)公司不愿意受保。 學(xué)知網(wǎng)（ ）專注于提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的 管理培訓(xùn) 課程與服務(wù) 7 Agency Problems and Behavior 代理人的行為與問(wèn)題 ? A horizon problem 水平界線問(wèn)題
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