【正文】 更多的市場占有率和市場份額，那么這種觀點(diǎn)就不能成立了。 會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的早期爭議 在 20 世紀(jì)的下半葉，學(xué)術(shù)界和出現(xiàn)了關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的各種爭論和專業(yè)文獻(xiàn)。這一觀點(diǎn)，由西澳佩頓教授，在理論上和書面上被闡述出來，他著重強(qiáng)調(diào)了公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的重要性。伴隨著這些美國大公司的出現(xiàn)的，也包括著對(duì)公司商業(yè)性的理解的改變。這些專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)師和審 計(jì)師就有可能同時(shí)對(duì)不同的實(shí)體出具財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告、為不同的投資群體工作。 畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 外 文 文 獻(xiàn) 翻 譯 系 別 經(jīng)濟(jì)管理系 專 業(yè) 班 姓 名 評(píng) 分 導(dǎo) 師（簽名） 2020 年 2 月 28 日 變化中的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性 —— 與 當(dāng)前環(huán)境與時(shí)俱進(jìn) ， 理查德 在此期間，數(shù)量上相對(duì)來說較少的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所，卻要對(duì)相對(duì)來說大數(shù)量的群體執(zhí)行審計(jì)的任務(wù)。這一變化的出現(xiàn)是與美國的大型工業(yè)公司，如采礦，鐵路，能源，電力和電信，的出現(xiàn)相關(guān)聯(lián)的。會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的概念，轉(zhuǎn)向?yàn)樵谪?cái)務(wù)狀況 和經(jīng)營業(yè)績的報(bào)告中保持客觀性和中立性，而不是忠于某一政黨。一個(gè)潛在的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的新概念，仍然未能演變出來，但上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督委員會(huì)（ PCAOB ）對(duì) 這種獨(dú)立性的概念上，似乎更強(qiáng)調(diào)要在更大程度上區(qū)分注冊(cè)審計(jì)師和客戶管理的獨(dú)立性。 用這種經(jīng)濟(jì)上的理論來解釋會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，似乎是合乎邏輯的。 “我們這樣做很好。 “信任我們。在受到聯(lián)邦政府的反壟斷訴訟的威脅下，美國注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)不得不被迫取消了這些對(duì)反競爭的做法的禁令。雖然這一會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的新概念，對(duì)于某種環(huán)境下的某個(gè)審計(jì)者，可能是適合的，但往往審計(jì)者會(huì)努力去用欺騙性的會(huì)計(jì)數(shù)字，幫助隱瞞經(jīng)營狀況，從而隱瞞真實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)績。 除此之外，還有輪換任用的審計(jì)方法。 從本質(zhì)上來說，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到以前制定的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，被美國注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)和美國證券交易委員會(huì)，通過獨(dú)立標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會(huì)，又進(jìn)一步的發(fā)展了。 that is, auditors are assumed to maintain independence and objectivity so as not to harm their longerterm economic interests. This assumes that auditors continually evaluate the costs and benefits associated with ethical behavior and always resolve conflicts in favor of behaving ethically because doing so produces the greatest longterm economic benefit. While these assumptions may be argued, it can also be observed that the individual economic calculus of a particular auditor may weigh in favor of retaining an important client rather than being objective and independent, thus undermining the “trust us” argument. Changes in the Market That Affected Auditor Independence Jonathan Weil, in “Behind Ways of Corporate Fraud: A Change in How Auditors Work” (The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2020), suggests that during the 1970s and 1980s the market for audit services and the way in which audits were conducted changed, contributing to a decline in auditor independence. The first ponent of change was price petition. Prior to the 1970s, the AICPA Code of Conduct prohibited auditors from publicly advertising their services, from making uninvited solicitations to rival firms’ clients, and from participating in petitive bidding for audits. Under threats of antitrust action by the federal government, the AICPA was pelled to remove these prohibitions against petitive practices. As a result, petitive bidding in auditing became monplace. The second change in how audits were conducted was an increased emphasis on “riskbased auditing.” Riskbased auditing is reasonable in that the largest amount of audit effort is placed on the greatest areas of audit risk. This logical idea assumes, however, that auditors are experts in determining the riskiest areas of a pany’s operations. Unfortunately, as Enron and other business failures have demonstrated, some auditors are not sufficiently able to determine which areas of a pany’s operations are subject to the greatest risks. In addition, auditors using a riskbased approach might not detect fraudulent activities. While this new concept of auditor independence may be appropriate for an auditor in certain circumstances, too often an auditor’s efforts to aid management resulted in misleading accounting numbers that concealed true economic performance. During the 1990s, it appeared that some auditors neglected their most immediate responsibility to act on behalf of thirdparty investors or, at a minimum, to be an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards. Pre–SarbanesOxley Proposals to Enhance Auditor Independence A legal prohibition against an auditor possessing a financial interest in a client has been the cornerstone of auditor independence rules in the United States since the 1930s. Until the 1990s, this was not necessarily true in the United Kingdom and some other countries, even though prohibitions against holding financial interests were generally observed in practice because of the standards of the accounting institutes and mon law. Currently, a prohibition against auditors possessing financial interests in clients is virtually a universal principle. Both the SEC and the public accounting profession have focused most of their attention regarding auditor independence on defining and enforcing prohibitions against financial interests