【正文】 20 世紀(jì) 30 年代直至 20 世紀(jì) 90 年代期間，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú) 立性原則存在的基礎(chǔ)。但這并不代表這在英國(guó)或其他一些國(guó)家也是同樣正確，即使禁止金融利益上的連帶關(guān)系，通常是實(shí)際中按照最基本的會(huì)計(jì)制度中留心觀察，就可以得出的結(jié)論性做法。 實(shí)際上，目前，禁止擔(dān)任審計(jì)工作的會(huì)計(jì)師擁有客戶的財(cái)務(wù)利益幾乎是一個(gè)普遍性的原則。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)和公共會(huì)計(jì)行業(yè)都不約而同的把的他們大部分的注意力，重點(diǎn)地放在，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性概念的界定，和對(duì)財(cái)政利益的禁令的執(zhí)行上。詳細(xì)的規(guī)則和報(bào)告結(jié)構(gòu)已制定的出來(lái)了，目的是為了要揭露，任何一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的職業(yè)雇員，所可能擁有的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益，也包括這些職業(yè)雇 員的配偶，父母，或他們的孩子。上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)采用了這些規(guī)則中的一大部分，這在一定程度上緩和了那些制度上有不合理地方的地區(qū)的問(wèn)題。 除此之外，還有輪換任用的審計(jì)方法。在某些國(guó)家，如意大利，審計(jì)者可以對(duì)委托人執(zhí)行某一個(gè)特定年限的審計(jì)工作。這種類型的管理方法，在美國(guó)和英國(guó)，從來(lái)沒(méi)有被認(rèn)真的考慮過(guò)。雖然法案要求，個(gè)別審計(jì)者要定期地輪換委托人客戶。而在法國(guó)，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的輪換概念是顛倒的：即審計(jì)者的任期為一段固定的時(shí)間，在這段時(shí)間里，他們不能被取代。這種規(guī)則的制定，目的是增加會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性，因?yàn)橛纱藢徲?jì)者對(duì) 于被客戶解雇的擔(dān)憂就減少了。 關(guān)于會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)通過(guò)了臨時(shí)準(zhǔn)則3600T 作為其規(guī)章制度。第 3600T 準(zhǔn)則如下： 任何有關(guān)審計(jì)報(bào)告的籌備或發(fā)布的，已經(jīng)登記的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所及其所有相關(guān)人員，都應(yīng)遵從獨(dú)立性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)： （一）依照美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)的專業(yè)行為守則第 101 條所描述的，依照裁決的特殊解釋除外，在 2020 年 4 月 16 日 [美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)專業(yè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，東部部分 101 條和 191 條（美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì) 2020） ]的范圍內(nèi)，是不能取代或修正的； （二）標(biāo)準(zhǔn)第 1 號(hào)、第 2 號(hào)、第 3 號(hào)， 及解釋中的 991， 001 和 002，在獨(dú)立準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)的范圍內(nèi)，不能取代或修正。 從本質(zhì)上來(lái)說(shuō)，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管委員會(huì)已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到以前制定的會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，被美國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)和美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)，通過(guò)獨(dú)立標(biāo)準(zhǔn)委員會(huì)，又進(jìn)一步的發(fā)展了。 對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的重新思考 我們現(xiàn)在需要的，是一個(gè)完整的對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)師審獨(dú)立性概念的重新思考。這種復(fù)議可能帶來(lái)一種會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的新概念，它是基于重申專業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的客觀性和中立性極其道德規(guī)范上的，而不是主張站在委托人、客戶的立場(chǎng)上?？紤]到一些最近和正在發(fā)生的會(huì)計(jì)和 審計(jì)丑聞，顯然，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性不應(yīng)該站在客戶的立場(chǎng)上。 這種觀點(diǎn)要求，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的新概念要結(jié)合具體的主張來(lái)實(shí)施： （ 1）審計(jì)者不應(yīng)該提倡擁護(hù)他們的客戶； （ 2）管理者不能影響查賬公費(fèi)，即審計(jì)費(fèi)用和會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的范圍。如果沒(méi)有過(guò)渡到這一概念，會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，將極有可能只是做做門面功夫，根本不足以保證審計(jì)者在實(shí)際中獨(dú)立于委托人管理者而存在。 The Varying Concept of Auditor Independence Shifting with the Prevailing Environment， C. Richard Baker AUGUST 2020 As CPA Journal EditorinChief Robert Colson observed in his March 2020 column, “Auditor Independence Redux,” the concept of auditor independence has varied over the last 150 years. In a general sense, auditor independence has borne a relationship to the prevailing mercial environment in different time periods. There has not, however, been a clear transition from one concept of auditor independence to another. Frequently, more than one idea of auditor independence has been present in the discussion about independence between professional accountants and auditors, regulators, and the general public. The initial concept of auditor independence, which arose during the 19th century, was based on the premise, primarily British in origin, that a principal duty of professional accountants and auditors was the oversight of absente investments in the existing and former colonies of the British Empire. During this period, a relatively small number of accounting firms could perform audits for a relatively large number of entities. Professional accountants and auditors could render reports on the financial performance of different entities and could work for different investor groups. The concept of auditor independence during this era did not conceive of auditors as advocates for audited entities。 British investors explicitly forbade auditors from investing or working in the businesses that they audited. At the same time, as long as auditors maintained their primary loyalty to the investors back home, the scope of professional accounting services could be reasonably broad. For example, auditors were permitted to keep the books and prepare the financial statements for the entities they audited. This initial concept of auditor independence changed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During this time, there was an economic shift from capital ing primarily from foreign sources to capital deriving primarily from domestic sources. This change was associated with the emergence of large American corporations in industries such as mining, railroads, energy, and telegraph and telephone. The emergence of large American corporations was acpanied by a change in the understanding of the purpose and nature of the business corporation. In the 1930s, noted economists Adolf Bearle and Gardiner Means articulated this change by advancing the proposition that large corporations were based on the separation of ownership from management and that an important role for accounting and auditing was to properly value the proprietary interest of the corporation. In the context of this new idea of the corporation, the auditor’s primary duty was to serve the needs of the collective proprietary interest rather than a specific absenteeownership interest. This collective proprietary interest essentially prised domestic shareholders, that were often large banks or wealthy investors, but incr