【正文】 improvements in China?s strategic capabilities have ramifications far beyond the Asia Pacific region. China?s strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike capabilities, as evidenced by the DF31 intercontinental range ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2020. China?s counterspace program – punctuated by the January 2020 successful test of a directascent, antisatellite weapon – poses dangers to human space flight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations. China?s continued pursuit of area denial and antiaccess strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the modern battlefield to include space and cyberspace. The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decisionmaking, and key capabilities supporting China?s military modernization. China?s leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired endstates of the PLA?s expanding military capabilities. China?s actions in certain areas increasingly appear inconsistent with its declaratory policies. Actual Chinese defense expenditures remain far above officially disclosed figures. This lack of transparency in China?s military affairs will naturally and understandably prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown. Table of Contents Chapter One: Key Developments 1 Chapter Two: Understanding China?s Strategy 6 Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 15 Chapter Five: Resources for Force Modernization 25 Chapter Six: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 30 Appendix: China and Taiwan Forces Data 36 第 1 章 關(guān)鍵發(fā)展 中國的安全戰(zhàn)略和軍事戰(zhàn)略 Developments in China?s Grand Strategy, Security Strategy, and Military Strategy 北京在 2020 年 12 月發(fā)布了中國國防白皮書 ,這是自 1998 年以來第五份中國國防白皮書 , 描述了中國的安全觀念和國防政策 ,以及實現(xiàn)其現(xiàn)代化的計劃 . 所宣傳的政策 ,這份文件反映了中國輕微改善透明度 ,但這并不充分的闡述了中國軍事力量的構(gòu)成 , 宗旨和軍事發(fā)展的 預期目的 . Beijing released China?s National Defense in 2020 in December, its fifth Defense White Paper since 1998, to describe China?s security perceptions, national defense policies, and the goals of its modernization programs. As declaratory policy, the paper reflects a modest improvement in transparency, but it does not adequately address the position of China?s military forces, or the purposes and desired endstates of China?s military development. 北京在 2020 年 10 月發(fā)布了中國的航天活動 ,而前一版是于 2020 年出版 . 本文 回顧中國太空計劃的歷史 ,并提出了一個未來的規(guī)劃圖 . 該文件還討論了中國同各合作伙伴參與空間活動 . 但它為能明確記載中國的航天計劃和反空間活動 ,以及空間的軍事應用 . Beijing released China?s Space Activities in 2020 in October – the previous edition was published in 2020. The paper reviews the history of China?s space program and presents a roadmap for the future. The paper also discusses China?s cooperation with various partners in space activities. It remains silent on the military applications of China?s space programs and counterspace activities. 2020 年 1 月 ,中國向本國的一顆氣象衛(wèi)星成 功地試射了一枚反衛(wèi)星導彈 , 展示了中國有能力攻擊在低地球軌道上運行的衛(wèi)星 . 測試所產(chǎn)生的前所未有的碎片對所有的有空間航行器的國家構(gòu)成了危害 . In January 2020, China successfully tested a directascent, antisatellite (ASAT) missile against a Chinese weather satellite, demonstrating China?s ability to attack satellites operating in lowEarth orbit. The test put at risk the assets of all space faring nations and posed dangers to human space flight due to the creation of an unprecedented amount of debris. 證據(jù)表明在 2020年 ,中國修改了 1993年新的歷史時期的軍事戰(zhàn)略方針 , 人民解放軍指導文件的軍事戰(zhàn)略與軍事 力量的發(fā)展 . 具體指引的內(nèi)容尚不得而知 . Evidence in 2020 suggests that China revised the 1993 Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period, the People?s Liberation Army (PLA) guidance documents for military strategy and forces development. The specific contents of the guidelines are not known. 中華人民共和國主席胡錦濤和俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京宣布 2020年為 俄羅斯年 ,并在北京期間舉行了 3 次會議 ,這是在不到 12 個月的時間內(nèi) ,兩國領導人之間的第五次會議 . 兩國于 2020 年建立它們的聯(lián)合軍事演習 , 2020 年兩位領導人同意加強軍事交流 ,并舉辦八次軍事合作活動 . PRC President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed 2020 as “The Year of Russia” during their March meeting in Beijing, the leaders? fifth meeting in less than twelve months. Building on their joint exercise in 2020, the two leaders agreed to increase military exchanges and hold eight cooperative military activities in 2020. 在 2020 年最大的年度新能源所簽訂的合約中 ,反映了日益關(guān)注的能源和資源的需求 ,包括同沙特阿拉伯和幾個非洲國家的新的協(xié)定 . 中國努力使得中國與非洲國家在 2020 年的合作達到高潮 , 11 月的首腦會議在北京由非洲 53 個國家中的 40 個國家的元首以及 8個國家的代表出席 . Reflecting increasing concerns over energy and resource needs, 2020 saw the largest annual increase in new energy contracts signed by China, including new agreements with Saudi Arabia and several African countries. China?s effort to court African nations in 2020 culminated with a November summit in Beijing attended by 40 heads of state and delegates from 48 of the 53 African nations. 2020 年 3 月 ,中國正式開展的第 11 個五年計劃 ( 20202020 年 ),其中包括雄心勃勃的計劃20 %降低能耗 ,每單位國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值 (國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值 ) 2020 年增加了一倍 ,中國國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值到 2020年比 2020年番一番 ,整體國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值 4萬億美元 ,到 2020年 . 該計劃強調(diào)和諧發(fā)展 ,加強在農(nóng)村的投入 ,解決收入差距和社會動蕩 . In March 2020, China formally launched its 11th Five Year Plan (20202020), which includes ambitious calls for a 20 percent reduction in energy consumption per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2020, a doubling of China?s 2020 GDP by 2020, and an overall GDP of $4 trillion by 2020. The plan stresses coordinated development, and greater investment and urbanization in the rural interior, to address ine disparities and social unrest. 官方的報告稱 , 在 2020年完成 群眾性事件 下降 22 % . 不過 ,在這些事件中 ,主要是針對地方政策以及官員 , 持續(xù)反映了民眾對財產(chǎn)權(quán)利和強迫遷移 ,勞動權(quán)益 ,養(yǎng)老金腐敗和警察的暴行的不滿 . Official reports claim the number of “mass incidents” declined 22 percent in 2020. Nevertheless, these incidents, directed mainly at local policies and officials, reflect cont