【正文】 除了資金的缺乏 ,這是內(nèi)部 機(jī)構(gòu) 內(nèi)部 的或之間 合作延誤或 阻礙 了這些措施。顯然 , 在 之前被 認(rèn)識(shí) 危險(xiǎn)的信號(hào) 沒有 集中起來 正確地評(píng)估本拉登和基地組織策劃的威脅。像這樣的組織被稱為 “ 基地 ” 組織的 是 在阿富汗美國幫助反對(duì)蘇聯(lián)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng) 的時(shí)候。國家和地方執(zhí)法不 能合力 增強(qiáng)美國聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局 (FBI)的努力。描述 基地 組織的組織和運(yùn)行、一步一步重建什么最后導(dǎo)致 襲擊事件 ， 歐盟委員會(huì)已經(jīng)可以識(shí) 別出一些信息及時(shí)干預(yù) 使 基地組織喪失能力或至少可以阻止了這些具體的攻擊。 事件并不是一個(gè)特定的威脅 ； 當(dāng)它發(fā)生的時(shí)候 ,它 對(duì)大部分來說都很驚訝 —— 并不是關(guān)于 這么多關(guān)于組織支持 ,而是 關(guān)于時(shí)間、地點(diǎn) ， 和攻擊 方式， 即利用劫持民航飛機(jī)作為導(dǎo)彈。例如 ， 邊境 控制 ,都是一個(gè)防守 兼 進(jìn)攻 性 措施 ： 他們保護(hù)這些潛在的受害者 ， 但也約束恐怖分子的行動(dòng)空間。為了 追蹤 、捕獲、 審判， 最終被判 ， “ 犯罪 ” 必須 被辨認(rèn) 。 在 先前研究的基礎(chǔ)上 ， 對(duì)一個(gè)廣泛的文獻(xiàn) 研究，《 國內(nèi)、國際恐怖主義的組織形式》 (Mayntz 2020 年 )， 為了找出是我們可以從中學(xué)到 的 關(guān)于控制恐怖網(wǎng)絡(luò)的前提條件和機(jī)會(huì) ， 我分析 影響的 報(bào)告。 when it happened, it came as a plete surprise to most—not so much with respect to the organization behind it, but with respect to the time, the place, and above all the kind of attack, ., by using hijacked civilian aircraft as missiles. If there is no credible lead as to the place, the time, the kind of a threat, and the identity of the potential terrorists, only highly general defensive measures such as 濟(jì)南大學(xué)畢業(yè) 論文外文資料翻譯 3 rigid control over the movement of people, vehicles, and goods might serve. The extent to which such preventive measures are acceptable differs。 in authoritarian regimes, potential troublemakers may be detained (or even murdered), but in a constitutional state with a legalistic culture, the actions of public authorities are constrained by law. The first condition of successful control is therefore to recognize the existence of, and identity of, a potential enemy. Such recognition may not permit us to anticipate specific terrorist acts, but it does permit us to develop a more pointed offensive strategy, ., to incapacitate the person, group, or organization presumably planning unspecified terrorist acts. This could either be done directly by physical destruction, or indirectly by cutting off their supplies and narrowing their action space. WHY PREVENTION FAILED: THE CHARGE The Report deals mainly with two basic prerequisites of successful prevention: information and the ability to act on it. The mission argues that, but for the deficits existing on both counts, could have been prevented. Describing the organization and the operation of Al Qaeda, and reconstructing step by step what in the end led to the attacks, the mission has identified a number of points where timely intervention might have incapacitated Al Qaeda, or could at least have prevented these specific attacks. The mission enumerates ‘‘late leads’’ that were not pursued, and lists actions by the CIA and FBI that might have made a difference but were not undertaken (National Commission 2020, 266–277,355–356). At least two of the hijackers who had previously been identified as possible terrorists could, for instance, have been held for immigration violations, had they only been found in the . ‘‘In sum, the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and they did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the FBI’s efforts. The public was not warned.’’ (Ibid, 265) These failures, so the Commission maintains, were largely the result of insufficient information and insufficient action capabilities, which in turn followed f