【正文】 there are few industries in which the prospects seem bright for substantial gains in return on equity. 但要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，我並不是說所有美國公司表現(xiàn)的比以往差，事實上，反而是比以前還 要好一點，只是最低門檻比以前提高了許多，而遺憾的是，大部分的企業(yè)對此皆束手 無策，只能祈求門檻能夠大幅降低，極少有產(chǎn)業(yè)能為股東賺取高投資報酬的?！雇顿Y大眾慣於利用歷史 的本益比而經(jīng)營階層則習(xí)慣用傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)評價標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，但卻不去深思其前提是否早已改 變，但現(xiàn)狀的改變極其緩慢，那麼持續(xù)不斷地思考便變得相當(dāng)必要，而一旦變化快速， 則拘泥於昨日的假設(shè)將會付出極大的代價，而目前經(jīng)濟(jì)步調(diào)的變動速度快到令人窒息。 In past reports we have explained how inflation has caused our apparently satisfactory longterm corporate performance to be illusory as a measure of true investment results for our owners. We applaud the efforts of Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker and note the currently more moderate increases in various price indices. Nevertheless, our views regarding longterm inflationary trends are as negative as ever. Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration. 過去我們曾解釋通貨膨脹是如何使我們的帳面表現(xiàn)比經(jīng)濟(jì)實質(zhì)要好看的多，我們對 Fed(聯(lián)邦準(zhǔn)備理事會 )主席 Volcker 先生所作的努力使得現(xiàn)在所有的物價指數(shù)能溫和 的成長表示感謝，儘管如此，我們?nèi)詫ξ磥淼耐ㄅ蜈厔莞械奖^，就像是童真一樣， 穩(wěn)定的物價只能維持現(xiàn)狀，卻沒有辦法使其恢復(fù)原狀。 or (3) the price we have paid. 而我們也預(yù)期這些公司的未分配盈餘 (在扣除所得稅後 )將會 100%回餽給 Berkshire 及其股東，當(dāng)然若最後沒有，可能是出了以下幾種差錯 (1)我們所選擇的經(jīng)營階層有問 題 (2)公司的前景有問題 (3)我們付的價格有問題。 Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And, despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factors pelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate. Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.) 而很不幸的，你們的董事長並不屬於第二類的人，且儘管已充份體認(rèn)到須將重點擺在 第一類的公司，但真正命中的機(jī)率卻又少之又少，我們講得比作得好聽(我們忘了諾亞 的叮嚀：能預(yù)測什麼時候下大雨沒有用，必須要能建造方舟才算。 (2) Most anizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves, are measured by others, and pensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales。 We know that this translation of noncontrolled ownership earnings into corresponding realized and unrealized capital gains for Berkshire will be extremely irregular as to time of occurrence. While market values track business values quite well over long periods, in any given year the relationship can gyrate capriciously. Market recognition of retained earnings also will be unevenly realized among panies. It will be disappointingly low or negative in cases where earnings are employed nonproductively, and far greater than dollarfordollar of retained earnings in cases of panies that achieve high returns with their augmented capital. Overall, if a group of noncontrolled panies is selected with reasonable skill, the group result should be quite satisfactory. 雖然我們明瞭這些不具控制權(quán)的盈餘轉(zhuǎn)化為 Berkshire已實現(xiàn)或未實現(xiàn)利得的時間點 很難拿捏，但就長期而言，市 場價格或許變動不一，卻終將會與企業(yè)價值同步發(fā)展， 甚至不同的公司也會有不同的情況，一家將盈餘運(yùn)用得當(dāng)與運(yùn)用不當(dāng)?shù)墓荆矔? 不一樣的結(jié)局，總而言之，只要經(jīng)過合理的挑選，一群不具控制權(quán)的投資也會產(chǎn)生令 人意想不到的效果。我們的新計劃是讓所有股東皆能指定捐贈的慈 善機(jī)構(gòu)， (詳如後述 ) ，這使得當(dāng)年度盈餘減少 90 萬美元，往後將視我們公司所得稅 負(fù)狀況決定捐贈的金額。 Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, we would rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior. 不管對短期的帳面盈餘有何影響，我們寧願以 X 價格買下一家好公司10%的股權(quán)，也 不要以 2X 價格買下這家好公司 100%的股權(quán)，但大部份公司經(jīng)營階層的選擇剛好相 反，而且對這樣的行為總是能找到藉口。 The second category involves the managerial superstars men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they。 Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the openmarket purchase of fractional positions in panies with excellent business franchises and petent, honest managements. We never expect to run these panies, but we do expect to profit from them. 我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)很容易從市場買到一些由有能力且正直的人所經(jīng)營的公司股票，而事實上 我們也從未打算自己去經(jīng)營這些公司，但我們的確想要藉由投資這些公司而獲利。 An even purer calculation of performance would involve a valuation of bonds and noninsurance held equities at market. However, GAAP accounting does not prescribe this procedure, and the added purity would change results only very slightly. Should any valuation difference widen to significant proportions, as it has at most major insurance panies, we will report its effect to you. 當(dāng)然嚴(yán)格來 說，還必須把債券投資及非保險子公司所持有的股票以市價計算才更準(zhǔn) 確，然而 GAAP(一般公認(rèn)會計原則 )並未如此規(guī)定，而且這樣做對我們來說其實影響也 不大，當(dāng)然若其影響大到一定程度， (就像目前很多保險同業(yè)便是如此 )，我一定會向 各位報告。 Investment markets recognized this truth. During that earlier period, American business earned an average of 11% or so on equity capital employed and stocks, in aggregate, sold at valuations far above that equity capital (book value), averaging over 150 cents on the dollar. Most businesses were “good” businesses because they earned far more than their keep (the return on longterm passive money). The valueadded produced by equity investment, in aggregate, was substantial. 股票市場認(rèn)同這種道理，在過去的一段時間，一家股東權(quán)益報酬率達(dá)到11%的公司， 其市價約可以漲到淨(jìng)值的 倍，他們之所以被認(rèn)定為好公司的原因在於他們賺取的 盈餘遠(yuǎn)多於原先保留下來的部份，這些公司所產(chǎn)生的附加價值相當(dāng)可觀。 Unless passive rates fall, panies achieving 14% per year gains in earni