【正文】 re’s share of the undistributed earnings of panies we don’t control or significantly influence but in which we, nevertheless, have important investments. (We will be glad to make available to new or prospective shareholders copies of that discussion or others from earlier reports to which we refer in this report.) No portion of those undistributed earnings is included in the operating earnings of Berkshire. 去年我們曾詳細地討論無控制權(quán)持股盈餘的觀念，亦即那些我們無法控制或影響其盈 餘分配的一些重要的被投資公司 (我們很樂意與新股東或潛在股東討論這項話題 )，而 這部份的盈餘卻又完全未顯現(xiàn)在 Berkshire 的帳面之上。 Warren Buffett39。 However, our belief is that, in aggregate, those undistributed and, therefore, unrecorded earnings will be translated into tangible value for Berkshire shareholders just as surely as if subsidiaries we control had earned, retained and reported similar earnings. 然而，我們深信這些未分配且未被記錄的盈餘，仍將終與那些我們控制的公司所賺的 盈餘一樣轉(zhuǎn)化成 Berkshire 實質(zhì)的價值。 General Acquisition Behavior 企業(yè)購併行為常態(tài) As our history indicates, we are fortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small mitments “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well”.) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in marketable securities. 經(jīng)驗顯示，我們對於擁有整家公司或僅持有部份股權(quán)，並無特殊偏好，目前我們?nèi)猿? 續(xù)投資大筆資金在兩者之上 (我們儘量避免小額投資，因為一件事若一點也不值得去 作，那麼就算把它作得再好也沒有用 )，而事實上，由於經(jīng)營保險公司與禮券事業(yè)都必 須保持適當(dāng)?shù)牧鲃有?，所以我們本來就必須將資金大量投入於有價證券。相對地 在 Berkshire，即使是購併成功在望，其管理當(dāng)局的心跳也不會加快一下。 In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses even after their corporate backyards are kneedeep in unresponsive toads. 換言之，投資人永遠可以以蟾蜍的價格買到蟾蜍，但若投資人願意用雙倍的代價資助 公主去親吻蟾蜍的話，最好保佑奇蹟會發(fā)生，許多公主依然堅信她們的吻有使蟾蜍變 成王子的魔力，即使在她的後院早已養(yǎng)滿了一大堆的蟾蜍。直接 或間接的經(jīng)驗使我們深深體認(rèn)，要達到像他們那樣成就的困難性 (當(dāng)然也因為如此，近 幾年來真正成功的個案並不多，且會發(fā)現(xiàn)到頭來利用公司資金買回自家股份是最實在 的方法 )。 During 1981 we came quite close to a major purchase involving both a business and a manager we liked very much. However, the price finally demanded, considering alternative uses for the funds involved, would have left our owners worse off than before the purchase. The empire would have been larger, but the citizenry would have been poorer. 今年 (1981 年 )我們幾乎談成一筆大買賣，那家公司與其經(jīng)營階層都是我們所喜愛的 ， 但就是價錢談不隴，若堅持買下的結(jié)果，股東的利益不見得會比買之前更好，整個 Berkshire 帝國版圖可能會變的更大，但人民素質(zhì)反而會變差。 (2) the future economics of the business。 As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our nonrecorded “ownership” earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue. In just four ownership positions in this category GEICO Corporation, General Foods Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. and The Washington Post Company our share of undistributed and therefore unrecorded earnings probably will total well over $35 million in 1982. The accounting rules that entirely ignore these undistributed earnings diminish the utility of our annual return on equity calculation, or any other single year measure of economic performance. 而就像去年我曾提到的，我們在不具控制權(quán)的股權(quán)投資依投資比例可分得之未分配盈 餘其規(guī)模甚至超越我們公司本身的帳面盈餘，且我們預(yù)期這種情況將會持續(xù)下去， 1982 年光是其中四家 (GEICO、 General Foods、 及華盛頓郵報 )加起 來就超過 3,500 萬美元，由於會計原則規(guī)定，使得我們在計算帳面股東權(quán)益報酬與單 一年度獲利表現(xiàn)時，無法將這些未分配盈餘記入。 Over half of the large gain in Berkshire’s worth during 1981 it totaled $124 million, or about 31% resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year considerably outstripped the gain in underlying business values. Such market variations will not always be on the pleasant side. 在 1981年淨(jìng)值增加的 1億 2,000萬美元中，約有一半要歸功於 GEICO一家公司， 總的來說，今年我們投資股票市值的增加要比其背後實際代表的實質(zhì)價值增加數(shù)要大 得多，而請注意股票市值的表現(xiàn)不會永遠比實質(zhì)價值好。 Equity ValueAdded 股權(quán)附加價值 An additional factor should further subdue any residual enthusiasm you may retain regarding our longterm rate of return. The economic case justifying equity investment is that, in aggregate, additional earnings above passive investment returns interest on fixedine securities will be derived through the employment of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in conjunction with that equity capital. Furthermore, the case says that since the equity capital position is associated with greater risk than passive forms of investment, it is “entitled” to higher returns. A “valueadded” bonus from equity capital seems natural and certain. 另外一項因素可能使各位對公司投資報酬率的熱情再澆上一盆冷水，人們之所以要投 資公司股權(quán)而非固定收益?zhèn)睦碛桑瑐S在於公司經(jīng)營階層可運用這筆資金來創(chuàng)造比 固定利息收入更高的盈餘，從而人們才願意承擔(dān)萬一發(fā)生損失的風(fēng)險，所以額外的風(fēng) 險貼水是理所當(dāng)然的。 it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday’s assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has bee breathtaking. 然而這一切已成過去，但過去所得到的經(jīng)驗法則卻很難拋棄，「當(dāng)投資大眾與經(jīng)營階 層一腳踏進未來，他們的腦子與神經(jīng)系統(tǒng)卻還深陷於過去。 if our typical pany pays out all earnings, the ine return to the investor will be equivalent to that from a 7% taxexempt bond. And, if conditions persist if all earnings are paid out and return on equity stays at 14% the 7% taxexempt equivalent to the higherbracket individual investor is just as frozen as is the coupon on a taxexempt bond. Such a perpetual 7% taxexempt bond might be worth fifty cents on the dollar as this is written.