金融學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯--格萊珉銀行的歷程-金融財(cái)政-預(yù)覽頁(yè)
【正文】 e acquainted with the Grameen model in 1987, while researching rural finance in Sri Lanka. At the time it seemed that almost every NGO and donor project I visited had staff who had recently returned from a visit to the Grameen Bank. Most of these staff were very impressed with what they had seen and talked of ‘replicating’ the model. The Asian Development Bank, desperate to approve loans to Sri Lanka, dressed up its rural finance proposals as building on the Grameen Bank’s success – even though they were not using the Grameen model! The idea of replicating the Grameen Bank around the world crystallised when the US based group RESULTS and its Director, an experienced lobbyist, came up with the idea of a Microcredit Summit. Since 1990, the UN had convened a set of global summits that had set goals for poverty reduction, education, gender equality and other issues. The 1997 Microcredit Summit was not a UN event – it was organised by RESULTS – but it presented as a global summit, with claims of ‘microcredit is a human right’ and speeches from heads of state. It set a goal of mobilising US$ billion, so that 150 million households would be able to access Grameen Banktype loans by 2020. Some within the Microcredit Summit movement pushed for a focus on microfinance and a broader range of services but that did not suit RESULTS’ campaigning style. It needed a simple message. The Grameen Bank was a panacea, the world should replicate it! Can the Grameen Bank go bust? As the Grameen model was ‘exported’ overseas during the 1990s, the Bank continued to grow in Bangladesh. Client numbers grew steadily, but the portfolio grew more quickly as clients took bigger ordinary loans and new types of loans (especially housing). Those of us working in Bangladesh increasingly heard that repayment rates were falling, but that branch managers were massaging their performance figures by issuing new loans to defaulters. These were immediately used to pay off the outstanding loan and hide the problem of nonrepayment. There were also criticisms of the gender achievements of the Bank: did it merely get women to take loans that they gave straight to their husbands? Then, there were criticisms of the idea that Yunus propounded, of every Grameen Bank loan being used for microenterprise, and every microenterprise being fieldwork showed that Grameen Bank clients used their loans for many different purposes – business, food consumption, health, education and even dowry. Grameen loans did not go to microfirms for a single, specific investment。這導(dǎo)致了 2020 年格萊珉銀行模式二的推出，正是基于以上問題的分析。截止 2020 年 2 月底，它有 740 萬(wàn)客戶和未償還貸款 億美元。但是在 2020 和 2020 年鄉(xiāng)村銀行在其服務(wù)方面取得了戲劇性的改變。現(xiàn)在讓我們開始。這個(gè)國(guó)家正處在一場(chǎng)摧毀了其基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，生產(chǎn)力，一大批知識(shí)分子的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的緩慢恢復(fù)階段，整個(gè)國(guó)家依賴于糧食的援助，不管是城市還是農(nóng)村人們都遭受著巨大的苦難。 這是一個(gè)有趣的理論，但它最初的實(shí)驗(yàn)表明它似乎是無(wú)效的。 最后尤努斯想出了一個(gè)有效的模型，它的主要特征有 貸款給農(nóng)村地區(qū)的貧困婦女（相比男性，她們很少會(huì)不合理地使用貸款，并且歸還貸款更加可靠） 把婦女們按五人分成一個(gè)小組，小組成員里的每一個(gè)對(duì)其他人的貸款負(fù)有同樣的責(zé)任（ 建立社會(huì)擔(dān)保和同等的篩選過程） 建立一個(gè)中心，每個(gè)星期的設(shè)定時(shí)間，使得六個(gè)小組的婦女來(lái)申請(qǐng)和歸還貸款。在 20 世紀(jì)80 年代初，在孟加 拉的很多外國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)都面臨一個(gè)巨大的問題：他們提出的補(bǔ)助 金政府機(jī)構(gòu)只做出了微弱的解釋，且收效甚微。如果他像泰國(guó)盤古銀行那樣運(yùn)營(yíng)下去，格萊珉銀行的擴(kuò)建就會(huì)帶來(lái)像其他國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行那樣的問題：任人唯親的員工招聘和晉升，金融腐敗，政治化的貸款組合，對(duì)客戶隨便的態(tài)度。 在 20 世紀(jì) 80 和 90 年代初，鄉(xiāng)村銀行穩(wěn)步擴(kuò)大，有大批捐助資金不斷涌入。 格萊珉銀行在世界各地得到了推廣，它不僅對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家有針對(duì)性，對(duì)美國(guó)和加拿大也有影響。自 1990 年以來(lái)，聯(lián)合國(guó)召開了全球首腦減貧首腦會(huì)議，旨在解 決全球的教育、性別平等其他一些全球性問題。因此格萊珉銀行是成功的，應(yīng)該在世界范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行推廣。這些貸款是用來(lái)償還未償還的貸款呢，還是回避這個(gè)問題，將貸款用于其它地方呢？這樣的做法也使該行遭受了批評(píng)：這樣做是讓那些女人們直接利用貸款還是將貸款交給她們的丈夫呢？這樣，尤努斯的想法值得商榷，每一個(gè)鄉(xiāng)村銀行的貸款用于微型企業(yè)，是否是成功的呢？ 實(shí)地調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)，鄉(xiāng)村銀行的客戶可以將他們的貸款用作許多不同的用途： 商業(yè)，食品消費(fèi)，健康，教育，甚至嫁妝。但是，從格萊珉銀行留下來(lái)的客戶中，他們?cè)诔惺芰似胀ǖ馁J款以外，還取得了住房貸款，因此他們的債務(wù)無(wú)法從他們的收入中進(jìn)行支付。 事情演變成了一個(gè)問題，在 2020 年 丹尼爾珀?duì)?危機(jī)時(shí)，一個(gè)紐約時(shí)報(bào)的記者發(fā)表了一篇文章說(shuō)，格萊珉銀行幾乎是已經(jīng)破產(chǎn)了。這個(gè)策略的第一步就是銀行職員以當(dāng)?shù)氐乃?，精心?zhǔn)備參與到整個(gè)投資組合中去。尤努斯教授通過動(dòng)員捐助者的捐贈(zèng)和政府補(bǔ)助來(lái)抵消這些不良貸款的損失。此模式在滿足客戶需求的基礎(chǔ)上，能夠帶來(lái)更多的盈利。 摒棄了過去的 連帶責(zé)任 一個(gè)以扶貧為目標(biāo)的計(jì)劃，為乞丐提供小額的補(bǔ)貼貸款，并且鼓勵(lì)他們加入鄉(xiāng)村銀行。它的貸款組合比它的儲(chǔ)蓄組合要小。這部分是因?yàn)榭蛻舳俗龅暮芎?，而另一部分原因是產(chǎn)品的重新設(shè)計(jì)和利潤(rùn)的擴(kuò)展。 格萊珉銀行的將來(lái) 格萊珉銀行看起來(lái)是孟加拉的小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的一種安全的未來(lái)模式，并且應(yīng)該繼續(xù)在小額信貸市場(chǎng)上發(fā)揮主要作 用。如果格萊珉銀行倒閉，則對(duì)減少貧困的樂觀預(yù)期和國(guó)際發(fā)展會(huì)
畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1