【正文】 (., Hanlon 2020)。因此，出口退稅當(dāng)前被作為適當(dāng)?shù)睦碚撚脕?lái)評(píng)價(jià)稅后會(huì)計(jì)績(jī)效為基礎(chǔ)的獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃的效力。第二個(gè)假設(shè)， 為另一種表現(xiàn)形式，如下： H2:對(duì)事業(yè)部經(jīng)理使用 會(huì)計(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的績(jī)效措施， 將 導(dǎo)致較低的出口退稅。 類(lèi)似地， Mintz (1999, 2) 列舉了 高露潔公司財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān) 關(guān)于 稅后業(yè)績(jī)計(jì)量的說(shuō)法： 是關(guān)于稅前收入的管理激勵(lì)， 公司在考慮 將支付 給 員工 多少 獎(jiǎng)金 時(shí) 得多注意稅收優(yōu)惠的影響 ?? 但是，由于激勵(lì) 的報(bào)酬 取決于稅后收益回報(bào) ?? 當(dāng)公司稅收降低會(huì)使經(jīng)理得到更多的 報(bào)酬。在會(huì)議上傳達(dá)稅收籌劃效果對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官稅后獎(jiǎng)金的重要性，從而對(duì)他們產(chǎn)生足夠的激勵(lì)，以使事業(yè)部經(jīng)理 通過(guò) 加倍 努力來(lái)降低企業(yè)的出口退稅。 在調(diào)低出口退稅，增加稅后會(huì)計(jì)收益方面，怎么使事業(yè)部經(jīng)理更加的努 力，增加稅收抵免，并導(dǎo)致應(yīng)納稅所得額永久性差異的降低？高露潔 公司首席財(cái)務(wù)官說(shuō)“高露潔人提供學(xué)習(xí)的機(jī)會(huì)經(jīng)常留意海外 [從而導(dǎo)致更高的外國(guó)稅收抵免 ]時(shí)間匯款的方式，最大限度地提高研究和發(fā)展的稅收抵免” (Mintz 1999, 2.) 事業(yè)部經(jīng)理也可以幫助稅務(wù)專(zhuān)業(yè)人士制定轉(zhuǎn)移價(jià)格 (Ernst amp。第一個(gè)假設(shè)， 闡明的另一種形式是： H1: 利用企業(yè)稅后業(yè)績(jī)?yōu)榛A(chǔ)來(lái)衡量首席執(zhí)行官的獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃將導(dǎo)致出口退稅的降低。 同樣地， 在目前的研究中使用的出口退稅是利用 計(jì)算器 計(jì)算所得稅費(fèi)用總額，從而排除了臨時(shí) 繳稅財(cái)產(chǎn)清單和稅率 差異的影響。s ETR differs from the statutory rate only to the extent it has opportunities to take actions that either increase or decrease taxable ine or tax credits (Mills et al. 1998). Consistent with prior research (., Newman 1989。s tax burden or to evaluate a firm39。 Guidry et al. 1999). Compensating a firm39。s accountingbased bonus plan signals tax planning39。s SBU managers in the identification of taxplanning opportunities, but also their cooperation in developing and executing strategies to capitalize on such opportunities. In the context of lowering the ETR and increasing aftertax accounting ine, how do SBU managers participate in efforts that increase tax credits and lead to permanent differences that lower taxable ine? ColgatePalmolive39。s taxplanning opportunities and the decision whether to use aftertax earnings in CEO bonus plans, but measures planning opportunities using only realized tax credits and absolute values of firms39。 II. 假說(shuō)發(fā)展 Newman (1989), Cares and Guffey (2020), and Atwood et al. (1998) 調(diào)查作為稅后盈利企業(yè) 對(duì) 首席執(zhí)行官獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃 包含 變量的選擇。 該文章的過(guò)程如下： 下一節(jié)闡述了在這項(xiàng)研究中測(cè)試的假設(shè)。 敏感性測(cè)試有助于進(jìn)一步排除了稅收職能外包的比例 ， 作為另一種解釋 ， 統(tǒng)計(jì)上和經(jīng)濟(jì)上顯示 事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的稅后報(bào)酬和出口退稅呈負(fù)相關(guān)。因此，本研究著重于 在 管理者的基礎(chǔ)上實(shí)現(xiàn)的稅后補(bǔ)償效益，但不提供相關(guān)的成本，規(guī)模的證據(jù)。 對(duì)未來(lái)的發(fā)展模式是稅務(wù)策劃人與業(yè)務(wù)部門(mén)緊密 合作完成的 。要包括一個(gè)特別措施在經(jīng)理人的薪酬合同 中，這一原則要求持有一個(gè)衡量預(yù)期收益和負(fù)責(zé)任的經(jīng)理更加努力 工作來(lái)規(guī)避 所支付的附加工資之間的額外風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 以 某個(gè)側(cè) 面 來(lái) 研究 出口退稅與管理層薪酬的共同課題 ，衡量的結(jié)果是所有樣本公司可優(yōu)化關(guān)于被調(diào)查的選擇 (Ittner and Larcker 2020)。 Atwood et al. 1998。 Healy 1985。盡管有這一局限性， 出口退稅 還是 被用來(lái)衡量稅收功能 性 支出的有效性 （米爾斯， 1998）和企業(yè) 各 部門(mén) 稅務(wù)績(jī)效 （道格拉斯， 1996）。 關(guān)鍵 詞 稅收計(jì)劃 ； 性能指標(biāo) ； 內(nèi)源性的 處理 效果 引言 有效的 稅 收籌劃， 根據(jù) 斯科爾斯等人的定義 （ 2020） ，稅收籌劃 ， 即 最大限度地提高公司的預(yù)期稅后 凈 現(xiàn)金流量，要求管理者要考慮他們的決定 所造成的 稅后 結(jié)果 。 choices of aftertax earnings as the contracting variable in CEO bonus plans. These studies hypothesize that firms with greater taxplanning opportunities, consistent with the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, are more likely to use aftertax performance measures. Using proxies for taxplanning opportunities, these studies collectively find that multinational status, number of operating segments, firm size, and capital intensity are positively associated with aftertax CEO pensation. Atwood et al. (1998) also presents evidence that leverage is negatively associated with this choice. 5 企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對(duì) 報(bào)酬 的激勵(lì)作用 （上） 約翰 D potential ETRlowering actions that could have ambiguous effects on cash flows and aftertax profits are not driving this result. Further sensitivity tests help rule out the proportion of tax function outsourcing as an alternative explanation for the statistically and economically significant negative relation between after tax SBUmanager pensation and ETR. The results contribute to the accountingbased pensation literature by linking after tax accountingbased performance measures to SBUmanager involvement that is incrementally effective in lowering firms39。s SBU, increased tax examination costs, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Contrary to measuring aftertax pensation39。s actions can be expected to lower the ETR. 3 Even if a manager39。s pensation contract, this principle requires that the expected benefits from holding a manager responsible for a measure must be greater than the additional wage that must be paid to pensate the manager for the resulting additional risk and effort. Accordingly, an after tax performance measure should be used as a contracting variable in a manager39。s effectiveness in lowering a firm39。 ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and businessunit (SBU) manager levels. Prior aftertax performance measure research has focused only on the determinants of pensation CEOs using pre versus aftertax earnings (., Newman 1989。 Swenson 1999). Accounting research has addressed the relation between accountingbased pensation and managers39。 performance measures。 decisions to pensate managers on a pre versus aftertax basis. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that pensating businessunit managers, but not chief executive officers, on an aftertax basis leads to lower effective tax rates. KEYWORDS tax planning。 aftertax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether aftertax accountingbased performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning The ETR, an inestatementbased oute measure calculated as the ratio of total ine tax expense to pretax ine, generally measures the effectiveness of tax reduction strategies that lead to higher aftertax ine. A lower ETR, however, can only proxy for tax savings and does not always imply that aftertax ine and/or cash flows have been Despite this limitation, the ETR has been used to measure the effectiveness of spending on the tax function (Mills et al. 1998) and corporate tax department performance (Dougl