【正文】
s may be highly sensitive to the effects of certain government policies and institutions on their investments. Equity investments are generally very liquid, and the time horizons of equity investors are often relatively short. As a result, changes in government policies can trigger a swift response by investors. Government policies that enhance investor confidence—either directly, by providing shareholder protections and ease of exit, or indirectly, by expanding the economy and improving corporate earnings—will be rewarded by higher stock prices and market valuations. On the other hand, investors can quickly withdraw their funds if governments choose marketunfriendly policies, thereby generating downward pressure on stock prices and valuations. Stock markets, in short, are a valuable indicator of financial actors’ preferences over government institutions and policy outes. A fitting alternative measure of performance is the ratio of the stock price to pany earnings—or, in other words, the price that equity investors are willing to pay for an expected stream of profits. As with stock prices, these ratios reflect investors’ expectations about future earnings, but they also signal investors’ preferences over timevarying government policy and largely invariant political institutions. Because of the latter, crossnational variation in P ? E ratios persists even when national stock markets are hit simultaneously by global price shocks. The extant literature on the linkages between globalization and domestic politics has paid scant attention to the diverse ways in which countries are integrated into the world economy. By assuming that financial markets impose a unified influence on government policies, prior studies have overlooked the stark variation in the preferences of investors across different types of financial assets. In this article, we argue that equity investors are being an increasingly influential force in the global economy, and that their preferences diverge from those of other financial actors in important ways. To illustrate this divergence, we present empirical analyses of the political and institutional determinants of equity market performance across a sample of developed and developing countries. Among the most interesting findings are that market valuations are significantly associated with capitalaccount openness, shareholder protections, levels of development, and alternative domestic investments. In addition, equity investors appear indifferent toward government fiscal balances and the partisan orientations of government leaders. Given that countries are integrated into the global financial system in different ways, these findings lead to the quest