金融學(xué)外文翻譯-----一個國際歷史性的比較：2007美國次貸金融危機是否不同-金融財政-全文預(yù)覽
【正文】 urrency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop in (real per capita) output growth is over two percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden), the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over five percent, and growth remained well below precrisis trend even after three years. It is, of course, the more catastrophic casesthat policymakers particularly want to steer clear of. 1. Post War BankCentered Financial Crises: The Data Our main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward parisons of the United States 2021 crisis with other postwar crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenh S. Rogoff, 2021.) The extended data set catalogues banking and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some cases earlier). In order to focus here on data most relevant to present . situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises, nor industrialized country financial crises from the Great Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, it is striking how much the “this time is different” syndrome has already been repeated. First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge runupin . housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified by financial innovation (including to subprime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petroleum exporters. The huge runup in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in . productivity growth a fall in risk that acpanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary string of outsized . current account deficits, which now soak up roughly twothirds of all the world’s current account surpluses, many analysts argued that these, too, could be justified by new elements of the global economy. Thanks to a bination of a flexible economy and the innovation of the tech boom, the United States could be expected to enjoy superior productivity growth for decades, while superior American knowhow meant higher returns on physical and financial investment than foreigners could expect in the United States. Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a striking contractionin wealth, increases in risk spreads, and deterioration in market functioning. The 2021 United States subprime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling . housing prices, which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthy borrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been greatly magnified due to plex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices. As a benchmark for the 2021 . subprime crisis, we draw on data from nieen bankcentered financial crises from the postWar period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or segment of financial sector collapsed in a manner similar to that described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For further discussion and documentation, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2021). These crisis episodes include: The Five Big Five Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. O
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