會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)外文翻譯--大股東異質(zhì)性影響公司的會(huì)計(jì)質(zhì)量和信息不對(duì)稱-會(huì)計(jì)審計(jì)(文件)
【正文】 lity, since prior research has shown that large aggressive shareholders are more influential monitors and are more effective at initiating change within firms. As far as new block formations and information asymmetry, I predict a positive association between new block formations and firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Further, as hypothesized, the monitoring aggressiveness of certain large shareholders is positively associated with firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry are associated with large shareholders in the post investment period. This finding supports my main hypotheses and provides evidence of the effects of new large shareholder investment on firms39。s earnings. 。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Therefore, evidence consistent with increases or decreases in firms39。s investment pared to other large shareholders does not appear to be a significant determinant of firms39。 information asymmetry. I also predict that this association is influenced by the types of large shareholders in a firm. Specifically, aggressive large shareholders have been shown to be more effective at influencing firms39。 information asymmetry. I also predict that this relationship is influenced by the types of large shareholders present in a firm. Specifically, I predict that aggressive large shareholders are more positively associated with accounting quality and information asymmetry than moderate large shareholders. Since all large shareholders do not share similar monitoring capabilities, the aggressiveness as well as relative size differences of certain large shareholders contributes to the heterogeneity of large shareholder ownership. My final analysis focuses on the consequences of block formation on firms’ accounting quality and information asymmetry. I restrict my full sample to firms that have new large shareholder block formations. While this restriction reduces my sample significantly, the data provide a unique opportunity to present evidence on the consequences of large block purchases by examining the levels of the dependent variables in the pre and postblock formation periods. For new block formations, I predict a positive association between new block formations and firms39。 accounting quality and information asymmetry. Applying the three measures of ownership heterogeneity, I first examine whether LSH helps to explain the variation in firms’ accounting quality. I measure accounting quality using two accrualbased metrics. The two accrualbased models are the discretionary accrual model developed by Jones (1991) as implemented by Tucker and Zarowin (2020), and the accrual quality model from Dechow and Dichev (2020) as modified by McNichols (2020). Next, I examine whether LSH is related to marketbased measures of firms’ information asymmetry. I use two marketbased measures to examine the relationship between LSH and firms’ information asymmetry. The first measure, following Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998)hereafter BKLS”use analysts’ information precision as proxies for the precisions of total, public, and private information available to the capital markets. The second measure is the bidask spread which is used in the extant literature as a measure of infor
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