【正文】 e Bidding on Inplete Procurement Contracts Daniel P. Miller University of Minnesota Job Market Paper November 12, 2020 Abstract This paper investigates the cost implications of contractual inpleteness and itse ect on subcontracting decisions in the bridge construction industry. Construction contracts are inplete because the original blueprints and specications may require modications during construction. According to the transactions cost theory of the rm|Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)|such contract revisions can lead to signicant bargaining and renegotiation costs. Furthermore, theory predicts these costs are larger if a subcontractor performs the work. Forward looking contractors anticipate these costs and incorporate them in their bids. I develop an empirical framework to quantify the impact of inpleteness on cost for both integrated and nonintegrated transactions and apply it to 32 bridge contracts procured by the California Department of Transportation. Contracts contain many work items (. casting concrete,drilling, trac striping). For each item, contractors decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor and submit a bid. The di erence between the work item quantity in the original contract and the quantity actually installed after revisions proxies for inpleteness. In estimation, I account for the strategic aspects of bidding to recover cost from bids and exploit the panel data structure to account for the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. On average, inpleteness explains a small portion of cost, 2%, for integrated transactions and a large portion, 13%, for nonintegrated transactions. The results provide quantitative evidence in support of inplete contracting theories of the rm and have practical signicance for evaluating procurement practices. 10 1 Introduction Subcontractors play a vital role in the construction industry. They perform 50% of the work on civil projects and 75% to 100% on a typical private construction , the contractualhazards of subcontracting plague the industry. Sweet (2020), an expert on the legal aspects of construction contracting, expresses this sentiment by titling his chapter on subcontracting The Achilles Heel of Construction Management. The hazards he refers to usually involve contract changes, and the costs manifest in many ways. On a small scale, changes disrupt daytoday construction operations, but they can also lead to very costly outes such as arbitration and litigation. Semple et al. (1994) finds the average claim in their sample delays construction by 60% of the contract duration and es with a cost equal to the value of the original contract. Stories of subcontract misgovernance frequently reach headlines. An example is Boston39。舉例來說 ,從 1995 年到 2020 年 ,百分之九十七的公共部門的建筑在加利福尼亞北部 ,是建設(shè)項目使用競價收購。成本加成合同 ,相反 ,阻止節(jié)約的努力但談判過程中變化減緩和適應(yīng)合同正本要求。相反 ,復(fù)雜項目 ,我們定義為大范圍很難設(shè)計驚喜的決賽配置 ,應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得成本加成合同使用 ,必須有人陪同低含量的完整性 (意味著設(shè)計高機會 ,適應(yīng)了合同將需要 ),應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得通過談判和水平的和合格供應(yīng)商。 8 這些觀察建議 ,問題可能確實是采購為主理順或偽裝的適應(yīng) ,而不是項目后開始信息披露前由供應(yīng)商提供項目選擇。工程設(shè)計必須改變也由于法規(guī)環(huán)境 107 項目被放置于建筑物使用執(zhí)照的條件。這地質(zhì)的項目包括峽谷、飛機和地震的斷層滑動 ,哪一個為球隊帶來諸多挑戰(zhàn)建筑師與承包商。這然后不得不聰明的方法來推導(dǎo)出考慮供應(yīng)商費用 ,如提供供應(yīng)商很多潛在項目的選擇 ,并且在選擇一個供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)生 . 相反 ,學(xué)者和教育工作者的工程施工管理認(rèn)為的中心問題 ,供貨商采購是不知道的比較多在分娩比項目 ,但這兩不是和供應(yīng)商分享的不確定性對變化 ,許多重要的設(shè)計后的合同簽署、生產(chǎn)開始。本章提供了一個框架比較競爭投標(biāo)的談判并將這些獎付款程序機制的選擇 ,在合同。無論是在在采購經(jīng)理和私營部門可能鼓勵鉆機系統(tǒng)以換取賄賂和其它好處。由其自身的性質(zhì)決定 ,開放的競爭投標(biāo)邀請來自許多潛在的供應(yīng)商場所。第三 ,采購者需要決定如何獎勵潛在供應(yīng)商之間的采購合同。突出的例子包括電子元器件，定制軟件，汽車生產(chǎn)和建筑施工。我們稱這種為采購問題 采購問題已經(jīng)引起了政治界和學(xué)術(shù)界的廣泛關(guān)注。這些結(jié)果在采購的啟示私營和公共部門進行了討論。 1 外文原文 1： Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement Steven Tadelis Patrick Bajari University of California Berkeley University of Michigan Haas School of Business Department of Economics January, 2020 Abstract Should the buyer of a customized good use petitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we a framework that ?rst describes the buyer’s choice of contracts, and then links this choice to the selection of petitive tendering or negotiations. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of petitive tendering. These may perform poorly when projects are plex, contractual design is inplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, petitive tendering may sti?e munication between buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor’s expertise when designing the project. Implications of these results for procurement in the private and public sector are discussed. 1 Introduction Manufactured goods, such as puters, TVs and automobiles are mass produced, have standardized characteristics and are typically purchased at list price. Other goods, such as new buildings, fighter jets, custom software or consulting services are tailored to?t a procurer’s specific and often unique needs. To procure these customized goods,the procurer hires a contractor who supplies the good according to a set of desired specifications. We call this the procurement problem. The procurement problem has attracted much attention both in policy and in academic circles. The main focus of academic economists has been on procurement by the public sector, in part because of its