【正文】 nor do I model any other exante actions taken in anticipation of bargaining. Instead, I treat the predictions of theory in a reduced form manner and use the model to show why the inpleteness proxy a ects forecasted unit costs and thesubsequent subcontracting a subgame, I model subcontract model the strategic aspects of bidding which also depend on quantity changes. These are scoring auctions. The total bid is calculated by multiplying unit price bids with original quantities,then summing those values across tasks. For each task, the winner is paid its unit price bid times the quantity actually installed. Di erences in original and nal quantities induce strategic bidding behavior. The basic intuition described by Athey and Levin (2020) shows that bidders skew unit price bids above cost on tasks expected to overrun on quantity and below cost on tasks expected to underrun. By skewing, a bidder earns a higher prot without a ecting its total bidand hence probability of winning the contract. Bid skewing is risky. If the overrun (or, for thatmatter underrun) does not occur, the winning bidder suers a lose. The principles for allocating unit price bids are analogous to concepts from modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). The specic modeling choices match industry practitioners39。 decisions to hire subcontractors, or|using the term coined in the literature, their \make or buy the public sector, construction projects are typically procured using petitive bidding. The most mon contracting format is called designbidbuild. First, the buyer39。在美國公共部門的律例管理采購 ,通常是基于美國聯(lián)邦航空局法規(guī) ,大力支持使用具有競爭力招標。我們認為 ,簡單的職業(yè)活動 ,我們定義為易于設(shè)計和小的不確定性對生產(chǎn)所需要的 ,應當獲得使用固定價格合同 ,應伴有高水平的設(shè)計完整性 (防止需要嗎適應 ),所以最好是通過競爭獲得招標。鋼焊縫裂紋的這個建筑物的框架承包商重新引起的充分性和耐震設(shè)計標準的內(nèi)容被使用。供應商已經(jīng)信息對生產(chǎn)成本并不存在。開放的競爭機制以他們的透明度 ,使它更容易防止腐敗公眾。第二 ,一個合同必須設(shè)置合同義務(wù)和補償方法。獲取這些定制產(chǎn)品，采購人雇用了一個能根據(jù)一套理想的規(guī)格提供物品的承包商。 1 外文原文 1： Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering vs. Negotiations in Procurement Steven Tadelis Patrick Bajari University of California Berkeley University of Michigan Haas School of Business Department of Economics January, 2020 Abstract Should the buyer of a customized good use petitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we a framework that ?rst describes the buyer’s choice of contracts, and then links this choice to the selection of petitive tendering or negotiations. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of petitive tendering. These may perform poorly when projects are plex, contractual design is inplete and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, petitive tendering may sti?e munication between buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor’s expertise when designing the project. Implications of these results for procurement in the private and public sector are discussed. 1 Introduction Manufactured goods, such as puters, TVs and automobiles are mass produced, have standardized characteristics and are typically purchased at list price. Other goods, such as new buildings, fighter jets, custom software or consulting services are tailored to?t a procurer’s specific and often unique needs. To procure these customized goods,the procurer hires a contractor who supplies the good according to a set of desired specifications. We call this the procurement problem. The procurement problem has attracted much attention both in policy and in academic circles. The main focus of academic economists has been on procurement by the public sector, in part because of its sheer importance to the 2 example,procurement by federal, state and local government accounts for more than 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product in the United States. Many private sector transactions are also governed by procurement contracts. Prominent examples include electronics ponents, custom software, automobile production, and building construction. When considering the procurement of goods and services, the procurer is faced with many challenges. First, she has to choose what exactly should be procured, and how to transmit her needs to the potential suppliers. Second, a contract must be laid out that includes contractual obligations and methods of pensation. Third, the procurer needs to decide how to award the procurement contract between the potential , the award mechanism should result in the selection of a quali?ed and desirable supplier and in the implementation of a costeective ?nal product Following up on these last two points, petitive tendering is widely recognized asan attractive procurement mechanism and is monly advocated for several notably it is viewed as a procedure that stimulates and promotes its nature, open petitive tendering invites potential suppliers from many , in the face of petition from many potential suppliers each one has strong incentives not to in?ate his price. Indeed, fair market price discovery is often touted as a bene?cial result of such tendering. Open petitive mechanisms are also known for their transparency, making it easier to prevent corruption both in the public and private sectors where procurement managers may have incentives to rig the system Interestingly, there is widespread use of both petitive tendering and negotiations in the private sector. For example, from 1995 to 2020, fortyfour percent of private sector nonresidential building construction projects in Northern California were procured using negotiations, while only eighteen per