【正文】 icance. Public procurement agencies emphasize the petitive aspects of contracting. They try to promote petition with the goal of reducing bidder markups. Markup estimates are small, around 4%.9This suggeststhere are negligible gains available from promoting further petition. Instead, eorts to write more plete construction plans could generate signi cant cost savings|up to 17% for the transactions most sensitive to inpleteness. Moreover, the civil engineering industry is important to study given the urgency to replace and repair \structurally de cient public infrastructure. The Federal Highway Administration projects the need for an annual spending increase on bridges from $5 billion to $40 billion. In the conclusion, I o er a more indepth analysis and motivate ideas for policy research. This work is related to the empirical auctions literature. There is an especially large body of work on highway procurement auctions including the contributions of Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2020), Krasnokutskaya (2020), JofreBo and Pesendorfer (2020), Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (2020), Marion (2020), De Silva et al. (2020), and Bajari and Lewis (2020). This is the rst study to use work items as the unit of observation within the context of a structural auction Previous empirical work on bid skewing (Athey and Levin, 2020。inpleteness accounts for 13% of cost. The unit of analysis is at a detailed level. The engineer39。我們的結(jié)論的影響進(jìn)行了討論經(jīng)營(yíng)策略及公共采購(gòu) . 9 外文原文 2： Subcontracting and Competitive Bidding on Inplete Procurement Contracts Daniel P. Miller University of Minnesota Job Market Paper November 12, 2020 Abstract This paper investigates the cost implications of contractual inpleteness and itse ect on subcontracting decisions in the bridge construction industry. Construction contracts are inplete because the original blueprints and specications may require modications during construction. According to the transactions cost theory of the rm|Coase (1937), Williamson (1985)|such contract revisions can lead to signicant bargaining and renegotiation costs. Furthermore, theory predicts these costs are larger if a subcontractor performs the work. Forward looking contractors anticipate these costs and incorporate them in their bids. I develop an empirical framework to quantify the impact of inpleteness on cost for both integrated and nonintegrated transactions and apply it to 32 bridge contracts procured by the California Department of Transportation. Contracts contain many work items (. casting concrete,drilling, trac striping). For each item, contractors decide whether to perform work themselves or hire a subcontractor and submit a bid. The di erence between the work item quantity in the original contract and the quantity actually installed after revisions proxies for inpleteness. In estimation, I account for the strategic aspects of bidding to recover cost from bids and exploit the panel data structure to account for the endogeneity of subcontracting decisions. On average, inpleteness explains a small portion of cost, 2%, for integrated transactions and a large portion, 13%, for nonintegrated transactions. The results provide quantitative evidence in support of inplete contracting theories of the rm and have practical signicance for evaluating procurement practices. 10 1 Introduction Subcontractors play a vital role in the construction industry. They perform 50% of the work on civil projects and 75% to 100% on a typical private construction , the contractualhazards of subcontracting plague the industry. Sweet (2020), an expert on the legal aspects of construction contracting, expresses this sentiment by titling his chapter on subcontracting The Achilles Heel of Construction Management. The hazards he refers to usually involve contract changes, and the costs manifest in many ways. On a small scale, changes disrupt daytoday construction operations, but they can also lead to very costly outes such as arbitration and litigation. Semple et al. (1994) finds the average claim in their sample delays construction by 60% of the contract duration and es with a cost equal to the value of the original contract. Stories of subcontract misgovernance frequently reach headlines. An example is Boston39。成本加成合同 ,相反 ,阻止節(jié)約的努力但談判過(guò)程中變化減緩和適應(yīng)合同正本要求。 8 這些觀(guān)察建議 ,問(wèn)題可能確實(shí)是采購(gòu)為主理順或偽裝的適應(yīng) ,而不是項(xiàng)目后開(kāi)始信息披露前由供應(yīng)商提供項(xiàng)目選擇。這地質(zhì)的項(xiàng)目包括峽谷、飛機(jī)和地震的斷層滑動(dòng) ,哪一個(gè)為球隊(duì)帶來(lái)諸多挑戰(zhàn)建筑師與承包商。本章提供了一個(gè)框架比較競(jìng)爭(zhēng)投標(biāo)的談判并將這些獎(jiǎng)付款程序機(jī)制的選擇 ,在合同。由其自身的性質(zhì)決定 ,開(kāi)放的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)投標(biāo)邀請(qǐng)來(lái)自許多潛在的供應(yīng)商場(chǎng)所。突出的例子包括電子元器件，定制軟件，汽車(chē)生產(chǎn)和建筑施工。這些結(jié)果在采購(gòu)的啟示私營(yíng)和公共部門(mén)進(jìn)行了討論。此外，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性招標(biāo)，可能會(huì)扼殺買(mǎi)家和賣(mài)家的交流，防止利用承包商的專(zhuān)業(yè)買(mǎi)家當(dāng)設(shè)計(jì)項(xiàng)目。許多私營(yíng)部門(mén)交易也是需要用采購(gòu)合同。最明顯的是被看作是一個(gè)過(guò)程 ,激發(fā)和促進(jìn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。使用單一的供應(yīng)商的談判中也常見(jiàn)高技術(shù)和軟件 ,并用于國(guó)防采購(gòu)。這個(gè)項(xiàng)目設(shè)計(jì)必須改變由于現(xiàn)場(chǎng)條件使人難以預(yù)料。最近的一種和更多的爭(zhēng)議例子就是“大挖 在波士頓 ,在那里12020改變超過(guò) 150設(shè)計(jì)和建造合同已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致 16億美元的成本超支 ,其中大部分即可追溯到設(shè)計(jì)和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)條件不與期望。這種效率損失 ,常常會(huì)由于磋商價(jià)格有真的鎖定現(xiàn)有供應(yīng)商的希望使用需要改變自己的優(yōu)勢(shì)。然后我們繼續(xù)描述如何選擇合同決定使用獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制。 Klein, 2020). This paper o ers one of the rst attempts to bring the missing data, examine the cost primitives of the theory, and, stated bluntly, to show that rm boundaries matter. Such a research design is made possible because bids reect cost. The main nding is that inpleteness has a negligible eect on cost for work performed by a prime contractor. The eect is large for subcontracting。 Bajari et al., 2020) restricted attention to just one dimen