【正文】 ere hard to anticipate. The geology of the project included canyons, slide planes and earthquake fault lines, which posed numerous challenges for the team of architects and contractors. For instance,contractors “hit a slide” and unexpectedly moved 75,000 cubic yards of earth. More severely, in 1994 an earthquake struck. Cracks in the steel welds of the building’s frame caused the contractors to reassess the adequacy of the seismic design standards that were used. The project design had to be altered also due to the regulatory environment— 107 items had to be added to the building’s conditional use permit. These problems were very hard to predict, both for the procurer and the contractor. However, it seems reasonable that once problems arose, the contractor had superior information regarding the costs and methods to implement changes. A more recent and much more contentious example is the “big dig” in Boston, where 12,000 changes to more than 150 design and construction contracts have led to $ billion in cost overruns, much of which can be traced back to unsatisfactory design and site conditions that diered from expectations. These observations suggest that the procurement problem may indeed be primarily one of smoothing out or circumventing adaptations after the project begins rather than information revelation by the supplier before the project is selected. In this Chapter we argue that the form of contracts and award mechanisms can be tailored in a way to help mitigate this procurement problem. In particular, a trade between 4 incentives to reduce cost and incentives to facilitate changes and share information will be the key force in our arguments of contractual choice. We argue that simple projects, which we de?ne as easy to design with little uncertainty about what needs to be produced, ought to be procured using ?xedprice contracts,should be acpanied by high levels of design pleteness (to prevent the need for adaptations), and are best awarded through petitive tendering. In contrast, plex projects, which we de?ne as hard to design with large scope for surprises in the final configuration ought to be procured using costplus contracts, should be acpanied by low levels of design pleteness (implying a high chance that adaptations to the contract will be needed), and should be awarded through a negotiation with a reputable and qualified supplier. The intuition for our prescriptions stems from a tension between providing incentives to lower costs and avoiding costly and wasteful renegotiation that follows requests for changes. The strong incentives to reduce costs that are oered by ?xedprice tendered contracts will lead the parties to the transaction to dissipate valuable surplus when changes need to be renegotiated. This eciency loss will often be due to haggling over prices when there is true lockin of the current supplier who wishes to use the need for changes to his advantage. Costplus contracts, in contrast, discourage costsaving eorts but ease the process of renegotiating changes and adaptation to the contract’s original requirements. We continue to argue that the choice of payment procedures, such as ?xed price and cost plus contracts, is tied in with the followup decision that a procurer faces: whether to award a procurement contract by petitive tendering or by negotiating with a potential supplier While our research has been motivated by practices in the private sector, it oers implications for the public sector as well. In the . the public sector statutes that govern procurement, typically based on FARs, strongly favor the use of petitive bidding. For example, from 1995 to 2020, niyseven percent of public sector building construction projects in Northern California were procured using petitive petitive bidding does have the advantage of unbiased awarding of projects, it fails to respond optimally to ex post adaptation. This suggests that public procurement of plex projects are suering from eciency losses. We begin our analysis in the next section with a simple framework to describe the procurer’s choice of devising a contract that will govern the procurement 5 relationship with a selected supplier. We then continue to describe how the contracts chosen will dictate the use of award mechanisms. We conclude with a discussion of implications for business strategy and public procurement. 6 中文翻譯 1： 激勵機制和獎勵辦法：競爭性招標在采購與談判 史蒂芬 Tadelis 帕特里克Bajari 密歇根大學(xué) 加州大學(xué)伯克利分校 經(jīng)濟學(xué)系 哈斯商學(xué)院 2020 年 1 月 摘要 買方會使用一個定制好的競爭性招標或談判選擇承包商嗎？為了關(guān)注這個問題，我們提供了一個框架，首先介紹合同買方的選擇，然后將這個選擇與競爭性招標或談判相聯(lián)系。分析表明對于使用競爭性招標有大量可能性的限制。當(dāng)項目是復(fù)雜的時候，這些可能會執(zhí)行不佳，合同的設(shè)計也不完整，很少有可用的競投者。此外，競爭性招標，可能會扼殺買家和賣家的交流，防止利用承包商的專業(yè)買家當(dāng)設(shè)計項目。這些結(jié)果在采購的啟示私營和公共部門進行了討論。 1 引言 制成品，如電腦，電視和汽車的大規(guī)模生產(chǎn)，他們有標準化的特點，通常按價格表購買。其他商品，比如新的建筑，戰(zhàn)斗機，定制軟件或咨詢服務(wù)定制是針對采購人的具體要求購買，他們通常有特殊的需要。獲取這些定制產(chǎn)品，采購人雇用了一個能根據(jù)一套理想的規(guī)格提供物品的承包商。我們稱這種為采購問題 采購問題已經(jīng)引起了政治界和學(xué)術(shù)界的廣泛關(guān)注。專業(yè)經(jīng)濟學(xué)家的主要焦點已經(jīng)在公共部 門的采購，部分是由于它對于經(jīng)濟有純粹的重要性。 1 例如，在美國，聯(lián)邦，州和當(dāng)?shù)卣牟少徴紘鴥?nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的百分之十幾。許多私營部門交易也是需要用采購合同。突出的例子包括電子元器件，定制軟件，汽車生產(chǎn)和建筑施工。 當(dāng)考慮采購的貨物和服務(wù)時 ,采購者面臨許多挑戰(zhàn)。首先 ,她必須選擇究竟什么應(yīng)該被采購，怎樣傳遞需要到潛在的新供應(yīng)商。第二 ,一個合同必須設(shè)置合同義務(wù)和補償方法。第三 ,采購者需要決定如何獎勵潛在供應(yīng)商之間的采購合同。最后 ,這個獎項機制會導(dǎo)致一個合格的選擇和理想供應(yīng)商和在實施一個有效的最終產(chǎn)品。 隨后這兩場分 ,競爭投標是被廣泛認可一個有吸引力的采購機制和普遍提倡