【正文】 ?xedprice contracts,should be acpanied by high levels of design pleteness (to prevent the need for adaptations), and are best awarded through petitive tendering. In contrast, plex projects, which we de?ne as hard to design with large scope for surprises in the final configuration ought to be procured using costplus contracts, should be acpanied by low levels of design pleteness (implying a high chance that adaptations to the contract will be needed), and should be awarded through a negotiation with a reputable and qualified supplier. The intuition for our prescriptions stems from a tension between providing incentives to lower costs and avoiding costly and wasteful renegotiation that follows requests for changes. The strong incentives to reduce costs that are oered by ?xedprice tendered contracts will lead the parties to the transaction to dissipate valuable surplus when changes need to be renegotiated. This eciency loss will often be due to haggling over prices when there is true lockin of the current supplier who wishes to use the need for changes to his advantage. Costplus contracts, in contrast, discourage costsaving eorts but ease the process of renegotiating changes and adaptation to the contract’s original requirements. We continue to argue that the choice of payment procedures, such as ?xed price and cost plus contracts, is tied in with the followup decision that a procurer faces: whether to award a procurement contract by petitive tendering or by negotiating with a potential supplier While our research has been motivated by practices in the private sector, it oers implications for the public sector as well. In the . the public sector statutes that govern procurement, typically based on FARs, strongly favor the use of petitive bidding. For example, from 1995 to 2020, niyseven percent of public sector building construction projects in Northern California were procured using petitive petitive bidding does have the advantage of unbiased awarding of projects, it fails to respond optimally to ex post adaptation. This suggests that public procurement of plex projects are suering from eciency losses. We begin our analysis in the next section with a simple framework to describe the procurer’s choice of devising a contract that will govern the procurement 5 relationship with a selected supplier. We then continue to describe how the contracts chosen will dictate the use of award mechanisms. We conclude with a discussion of implications for business strategy and public procurement. 6 中文翻譯 1： 激勵(lì)機(jī)制和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)辦法：競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性招標(biāo)在采購(gòu)與談判 史蒂芬 Tadelis 帕特里克Bajari 密歇根大學(xué) 加州大學(xué)伯克利分校 經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系 哈斯商學(xué)院 2020 年 1 月 摘要 買(mǎi)方會(huì)使用一個(gè)定制好的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性招標(biāo)或談判選擇承包商嗎？為了關(guān)注這個(gè)問(wèn)題，我們提供了一個(gè)框架，首先介紹合同買(mǎi)方的選擇，然后將這個(gè)選擇與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性招標(biāo)或談判相聯(lián)系。此外，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性招標(biāo)，可能會(huì)扼殺買(mǎi)家和賣(mài)家的交流，防止利用承包商的專(zhuān)業(yè)買(mǎi)家當(dāng)設(shè)計(jì)項(xiàng)目。獲取這些定制產(chǎn)品，采購(gòu)人雇用了一個(gè)能根據(jù)一套理想的規(guī)格提供物品的承包商。許多私營(yíng)部門(mén)交易也是需要用采購(gòu)合同。第二 ,一個(gè)合同必須設(shè)置合同義務(wù)和補(bǔ)償方法。最明顯的是被看作是一個(gè)過(guò)程 ,激發(fā)和促進(jìn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。開(kāi)放的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制以他們的透明度 ,使它更容易防止腐敗公眾。使用單一的供應(yīng)商的談判中也常見(jiàn)高技術(shù)和軟件 ,并用于國(guó)防采購(gòu)。供應(yīng)商已經(jīng)信息對(duì)生產(chǎn)成本并不存在。這個(gè)項(xiàng)目設(shè)計(jì)必須改變由于現(xiàn)場(chǎng)條件使人難以預(yù)料。鋼焊縫裂紋的這個(gè)建筑物的框架承包商重新引起的充分性和耐震設(shè)計(jì)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的內(nèi)容被使用。最近的一種和更多的爭(zhēng)議例子就是“大挖 在波士頓 ,在那里12020改變超過(guò) 150設(shè)計(jì)和建造合同已經(jīng)導(dǎo)致 16億美元的成本超支 ,其中大部分即可追溯到設(shè)計(jì)和現(xiàn)場(chǎng)條件不與期望。我們認(rèn)為 ,簡(jiǎn)單的職業(yè)活動(dòng) ,我們定義為易于設(shè)計(jì)和小的不確定性對(duì)生產(chǎn)所需要的 ,應(yīng)當(dāng)獲得使用固定價(jià)格合同 ,應(yīng)伴有高水平的設(shè)計(jì)完整性 (防止需要嗎適應(yīng) ),所以最好是通過(guò)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)獲得招標(biāo)。這種效率損失 ,常常會(huì)由于磋商價(jià)格有真的鎖定現(xiàn)有供應(yīng)商的希望使用需要改變自己的優(yōu)勢(shì)。在美國(guó)公共部門(mén)的律例管理采購(gòu) ,通常是基于美國(guó)聯(lián)邦航空局法規(guī) ,大力支持使用具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力招標(biāo)。然后我們繼續(xù)描述如何選擇合同決定使用獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制。 decisions to hire subcontractors, or|using the term coined in the literature, their \make or buy the public sector, construction projects are typically procured using petitive bidding. The most mon contracting format is called designbidbuild. First, the buyer39。 Klein, 2020). This paper o ers one of the rst attempts to bring the missing data, examine the cost primitives of the theory, and, stated bluntly, to show that rm boundaries matter. Such a research design is made possible because bids reect cost. The main nding is that inpleteness has a negligible eect on cost for work performed by a prime contractor. The eect is large for subcontracting。 nor do I model any other exante actions taken in anticipation of bargaining. Instead, I treat the predictions of theory in a reduced form manner and use the model to show why the inpleteness proxy a ects forecasted unit costs and thesubsequent subcontracting a subgame, I model subcontract model the strategic aspects of bidding which also depend on quantity changes. These are scoring auctions. The total bid is calculated by multiplying unit price bids with original quantities,then summing those values across tasks. For each task, the winner is paid its unit price bid times the quantity actually installed. Di erences in original and nal quantities induce strategic bidding behavior. The basic intuition described by Athey and Levin (2020) shows that bidders skew unit price bids above cost on tasks expected to overrun on quantity and below cost on tasks expected to underrun. By skewing, a bidder earns a higher prot without a ecting its total bidand hence probability of winning the contract. Bid skewing is risky. If the overrun (or, for thatmatter underrun) does not occur, the winning bidder suers a lose. The principles for allocating unit price bids are analogous to concepts from modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). The specic modeling choices match industry practitioners39。 Bajari et al., 2020) restricted attention to just one dimen