【正文】 the light of our model, we consider some anecdotal evidence demonstrating the plexities surrounding dividend policy. Section 5 concludes. Our dividend signaling model demonstrates that dividend policy is indeed plex. We have demonstrated that high dividends may have a positive effect on firm value, both by providing a positive signal of current performance (in terms of current ine), and in reducing the free cashflow problem (that is, the temptation for the manager to invest in negative NPV projects due to private benefits). However, when good positive NPV investment opportunities are available, a high dividend may indeed be value reducing if it prevents firms from being able to make these investments. However, management may refuse to cut dividends, thereby passing up these positive NPV opportunities, especially if the stock market has been conditioned to believe that high dividends signal a highquality firm. Our model thus emphasized managerial munication/education of investors, supported by managerial reputation considerations, as a means of eliminating this problem. We now consider some anecdotal evidence that provides a practical perspective to our theory, and demonstrates the realworld confusion surrounding dividend policy. The ―traditional‖ positive relationship between dividends and firm value Lease et al. (2020) provide the following examples where the market reacted in the ―standard‖ way, that is, positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases): Figgie International announced a cut in its quarterly dividend. on the announcement Figgie39。s (2020) international survey of CFOs of major panies in USA, UK, Germany, Canada and Japan reveals that this agency problem exists. The authors argue that managers should consider two factors when deciding whether to cut dividends: 1. How sensitive is the stock price to dividend changes (the adverse selection problem)? 2. To what extent can managers transfer information (that is municate) about the profitable investment opportunity so that investors will understand the reason for the dividend increase? Indeed, they state: If the managers believe that the reason for the dividend cut can be effectively municated to investors in such a manner that it would not result in a dramatic stock price decrease, then they should prefer investing over paying the full amount of the dividend. On the other hand, if they believe that a drastic decline in the stock price may occur, then they should continue with the normal dividend plan and postpone the investment opportunity. The ―flow of information‖ factor should be derived from the structural investors39。s share price increased from $ to $ (hence, the dividend cut, supported by positive munication to the market, was seen as good news). In contrast, Compaq Computer Corporation paid a dividend for the first time in 1997, causing its share price to fall (a dividend initiation was seen as a ―bad news‖ signal that the pany had run out of good investment opportunities). Wooldridge and Ghosh (1998) emphasize the importance of corporate munication and managerial reputation when cutting dividends to invest in growth. They pare the cases of Gould Inc. and ITT. In 1983, Gould Inc. announced that it was cutting its quarterly dividend in order to ―conserve cash that can be used to finance the growth of its electronic businesses the board set the new dividend in the light of the pany39。s ability to invest in new projects. We therefore argued that dividends may provide confusing signals to investors, who may view an increase in dividends favorably, either as a positive signal of current ine (that is dividends reduce asymmetric information problems), or as a means of mitigating freecashflow problems (that is dividends reduce agency problems). However, a dividend increase may be seen as a negative signal (the firm lacks growth opportunities), while a dividend cut may be seen as a positive signal (the firm has significant growth opportunities available). Our model identified two potential agency problems associated with dividend policy. First, the manager may cut dividends in order to invest in a negative NPV project, due to private benefits. Second, the manager may be unwilling to reduce dividends to take a positive NPV project, since he is concerned with the negative signal of current ine. We suggested that the latter problem may be mitigated by munication to investors, reinforced by managerial reputation effects. We believe that our integrated model has provided a springboard for future theoretical and empirical research into the plex nature of corporate dividend policy. 資料來源： Emerald Journal of Managerial Finance 2020(05):P394—413 譯文 ： 股利政策，信號和現(xiàn)金流量：綜合辦法 Richard Fairchild 信號假說和自由現(xiàn)金流假說認(rèn)為，股息政策 是由一個模型，集成了兩個假說缺乏阻礙。因此，該模型結(jié)合了信號和自由現(xiàn)金流 的 因素 。本文表明，在 股息削減管理 的情況下， 由于 投資管理 和 溝通 ，可能會緩解這個問題。事實上，黑色（ 1976）指出，“我們期待在更困難的 支付 股息 局面中，