外文翻譯------人民幣在中國(guó)：其價(jià)值、其可調(diào)節(jié)匯率和其未來(lái)發(fā)展(文件)
【正文】 ese local governments are effectively broke and eventually will need a central government bailout. Reminiscent of the age of the . “Robber Barons,” the widespread, systematic corruption and abuse of power is estimated to cost as much as 14 percent of China’s GDP per year. The financial system—which includes the banking, securities, and insurance sectors needs an urgent overhaul to improve efficiency and be ready for foreign petition under China’s WTO mitment. Job creation remains a daunting challenge given continued efforts at transforming the stateownedenterprises and improving productivity growth. Then there are longterm issues, such as the aging population。外文 原文 The Chinese RMB: Its Value, Its Peg, and Its Future TRADE IMBALANCES HAVE MORE TO DO WITH THE . THAN WITH CHINA The valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately and a great deal of pressure on the part of developed nations for revaluation. In addressing the issue of valuation, this paper develops a new purchasing power parity (PPP) index of China’s exchange rate and finds that the while undervalued, the undervaluation is neither unusual nor bad policy. Moreover, China’s overall external trade balance does not seem to be that far out of equilibrium. China’s desire to join the G7 club is likely to result in abandoning its peg, however, despite the increased risk to its economic development. The valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately. The IMF, . government, and the G7 finance ministers are urging China to revalue its currency,which is currently pegged at to the arguments for China to appreciate its currency roughly follow these lines: ? China’s currency is grossly undervalued。 underfunded pension and social security systems。 Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2020). But is revaluing the RMB part of the solution to this problem? A close look at the situation suggests that at best it may reduce the problem only marginally in the near term, while the longerterm impacts are unclear since foreign exchange policy changes can bring a host of unintended consequences. However, political reality gets in the way: politicians need to show voters and powerful lobbying groups that they are doing something. Exchange rates are a lowhanging fruit for them, even though they are a small fruit and—from the Chinese perspective—an unripe one. The really effective measures, such as addressing domestic demand imbalances and promoting . goods and services exports, are unfortunately political nonstarters in the United States. The perception that undervaluation of the RMB is the cause of . trade deficits has also meant that China’s efforts in adjusting export petitiveness through nonforeign exchange measures have received little attention in the political debate. Looking to the Future The central point of this paper is that while the RMB is clearly undervalued (especially by PPP measures), there really has been no fundamental change in the valuation that warrants intensive market pressure for it to have depreciated in 19978 and to appreciate now. Looking at the broad picture, the relationship between the RMB’s peg to the dollar and China’s external account surpluses and rising foreign reserves is not as clear as often argued. The contribution of the RMB’s undervaluation to external imbalances in both the United States and China is insignificant in parison with other structural factors, such as domestic demand imbalances for G3 and improving the investment environment (for Foreign Direct Investment—FDI) and export petitiveness in China relative to other countries. There are far better ways to address the imbalances with little distraction for China’s challenging domestic reform agenda. In particular, labor costs in China are rising. China’s political capital is best invested in other areas of structural reform. Unfortunately, given its much larger influence on the global economy, China probably cannot say “no” this time to external political pressure and may move sooner than it would like. If history proves that China depegged before it is capable of handling the shock, the lesson would be that the G7
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