股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效研究畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文參考資料及譯文-wenkub
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【正文】 in the linear regressions they estimate using Tobin’s Q and accounting profit rate as alternative measures of performance. However, they also estimate a piecewise linear regression of Tobin’s Q on insider ownership, and this does provide evidence of a nonmonotonic relation. The estimated piecewise regression is positive for management holdings of shares between 0% and 5% of outstanding shares, negative for management holdings between 5% and 25%, and positive once more for management holdings greater than 25%.11 The starting and stopping values of management holdings that define these pieces are not derived from theory but, rather, according to whether they mark changes in the pattern of the data. The plausibility of the different directions taken by the slopes of the adjacent segments in this piecewise regression might be rationalized as a reflection of the changing interests of professional management as its ownership interest moves from insignificant to significant, but the zigzag nature of the segment slopes is not suggestive of the uniformly concave downward or upward relation that might reasonably be expect from this rationalization. Moreover, Morck et al. ?1988. also find that the results from this piecewise regression are not robust to a substitution of accounting profit rate for Tobin’s . Demsetz, B. VillalongarJournal of Corporate Finance 7 (2021) 209–233 211 Other articles have followed the Morck et al. ?1988. study. Included among these are McConnell and Servaes ?1990., Hermalin and Weisbach ?1988., Loderer and Martin ?1997., Cho ?1998., Himmelberg et al. ?1999., and Holderness et .. Summary descriptions of these studies are provided in Appendix A. All rely chiefly on Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance, although a few also examine accounting profit rate, and all emphasize managerial shareholdings as a measure of ownership structure. Differences abound across these studies, in measurements and sample used, in estimating technique applied, in whether and how they account for the endogeneity of ownership structure, and in results obtained. Fig. 1 shows the results of all the studies of firm performance and ownership structure that followed Demsetz and Lehn ?1985..2 We do not judge here which of these articles offer?s. the most reliable guide. However, Fig. 1 suggests that these studies, viewed in totality, do not give strong evidence by which to reject the belief that firm performance and managerial equity ownership are unrelated. In Section 2, we analyze the conceptual issues surrounding each of the threemain aspects that seem to explain the differences in results observed acrossstudies: The measurements of firm performance, the measure of ownership structure used, and whether or not the endogeneity of ownership structure is taken into account in the estimation of the effect of ownership on performance. Our analysis suggests that none of the studies we examine treat ownership structure appropriately. It should be modeled not only as an endogenous variable but also, simultaneously, as an amalgam of shareholdings owned by persons with differentinterests. In particular, the fractions of shares owned by outside shareholders and by management should be measured separately. To our knowledge, no study to
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