股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效研究畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)外文參考資料及譯文-展示頁
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【正文】 would eliminate any systematic relation between firm performance and ownership structure. While we make no claim that the market in which ownership structures are formed is perfect, our evidence shows that it is not so imperfect as to create a systematic relation. 所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和企業(yè)業(yè)績 摘 要 本文考察了 公司 所有制結(jié)構(gòu)和性能之間的關(guān)系 。 Corporate performance。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司績效研究 Ownership structure and corporate performance Abstract This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multidimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields pensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect marketmediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is to be expected. q2021 Elsevier Science . All rights classification: G32。 G34 Keywords: Ownership structure。 Endogenous variable Introduction The connection between ownership structure and performance has been the subject of an important and ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature. The debate goes back to the Berle and Means ?1932. thesis, which suggests that an inverse correlation should be observed between the diffuseness of shareholdings and firm performance. Their view has been challenged by Demsetz ?1983., who argues that the ownership structure of a corporation should be thought of as an endogenous oute of decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders and of trading on the market for shares. When owners of a privately held pany decide to sell shares, and when shareholders of a publicly held corporation agree to a new secondary distribution, they are, in effect, deciding to alter the ownership structure of their firms and, with high probability, to make that structure more trading of shares will reflect the desire of potential and existing owners to change their ownership stakes in the firm. In the case of a corporate takeover, those who would be owners have a direct and dominating influence on the firm’s ownership structure. In these ways, a firm’s ownership structure reflects decisions made by those who own or who would own shares. The ownership structure that emerges, whether concentrated or diffuse, ought to be influenced by the profitmaximizing interests of shareholders, so that, as a result, there should be no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm performance. The empirical studies about the relation between both variables seem to have yielded conflicting results. Demsetz and Lehn ?1985. provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure argued for by Demsetz ?1983. and also assess the validity of the Berle and Means thesis: A linear regression of anaccounting measure of profit rate on the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholding interests ?and on a set of control variables., in which ownership structure is
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