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gers can use some of the free cash available for their own benefit, thereby decreasing the value of the firm (Jensen amp。 Majluf, 1984) contends that because of transaction costs and information asymmetry, firms finance new investments first with retained earnings, then successively with safe debt, risky debt and finally with equity. According to this pecking order model, more profitable firms should have lower leverage and lower shortterm, but not longterm, payout controlling for investment opportunities. In a simple version of the pecking order model, firms with high investment and growth opportunities are predicted to have high leverage (on the condition that investment is more than the internal capital). In a more plex version of pecking order model, firms with high investment and growth opportunity will carry low leverage taking into consideration current as well as future financing costs. In contrast with the agency theory of free cash flow, Myers and Majluf (1984) predict that leverage decreases with the higher level of free cash flow. Pecking order theory also predicts that firms with high future growth opportunities should pay out lower dividends. ShyamSunder and Myers (1999) introduce a funding deficit model to test the pecking order hypothesis of firm39。s payout ratio determines its retention ratio and, thus, its capital structure. Further, given the empirical evidence in support of the pecking order theory, corporate debt levels should be related to the cash flows retained by a firm and to its dividend policy. Indeed, because of the interdependence between dividend policy and capital structure, empirical studies of capital structure, including those that focus on the impact of firm multinational, are most likely missspecified unless they include an assessment of dividend policy. There is considerable evidence of this interdependence between dividends and capital structure. For example, consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, Adedeji (1998) suggests that if firms respond to earnings shortages by borrowing to pay dividends because of reluctance to cut dividends, financial leverage may have a positive relationship with dividend payout ratio, and a positive or negative relationship with investments depending on whether firms borrow to finance investments or postpone/reduce the investments. This hypothesized positive relationship between debt and dividend payout is empirically confirmed in Baskin (1989). Thus, according to pecking order hypothesis, corporate capital structure is positively related to its dividend policy. On the other hand, Jensen (1986) hypothesizes that dividends and debt are substitute mechanisms for controlling agency costs of free cash flows. Empirical finding of Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) supports Jensen39。 Malitz, 1985). Funding deficit (FundDef) is a measure of agency costs. According to ShyamSunder and Myers (1999), the funding deficit is: FundDeft = DIVt + Xt + Δ Wt + Rt?Ct : Where, Ct operating cash flow, after interest and taxes DIVt dividend payments Xt capital expenditures Δ Wt increase in working capital Rt current portion of longterm debt The agency issue in dividend payout decisions is similar to capital structure decisions in the presence of agency costs. Agency costs predict a positive relation between firm39。s level of fixed assets (COL) should be associated with higher leverage as high levels of such assets can be used as collateral for loans (Friend amp。 Sorensen, 1986). Jensen etal. (1992), Noronha etal. (1996), Kwok and Reeb (2020), and Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) also take into account NDTS as a determinant of leverage. As Graham (2020) notes, firm size has a negative influence on debt ratios. The natural log of total asset (Lsize) is the measure of firm size. Industry dummies are also added to control for variations across industries. Thus, we have the following variables: (a) D