國外博弈論課件lecture(8)(已修改)
2024-10-31 13:59 本頁面
【正文】 June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 1 Static (or SimultaneousMove) Games of Inplete Information Bayesian Nash Equilibrium June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 2 Outline of Static Games of Inplete Information ? Introduction to static games of inplete information ? Normalform (or strategicform) representation of static Bayesian games ? Bayesian Nash equilibrium ? Auction June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 3 Today’s Agenda ? Review of previous class ? Cournot duopoly model of inplete information (version three) ? Normalform (or strategicform) representation of static Bayesian games ? Bayesian Nash equilibrium June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 4 Static (or simultaneousmove) games of plete information ? A set of players (at least two players) ? For each player, a set of strategies/actions ? Payoffs received by each player for the binations of the strategies, or for each player, preferences over the binations of the strategies ? All these are mon knowledge among all the players. June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 5 Static (or simultaneousmove) games of INCOMPLETE information ? Payoffs are no longer mon knowledge ? Inplete information means that ? At least one player is uncertain about some other player’s payoff function. ? Static games of inplete information are also called static Bayesian games June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 6 Cournot duopoly model of inplete information (version three) ? A homogeneous product is produced by only two firms: firm 1 and firm 2. The quantities are denoted by q1 and q2, respectively. ? They choose their quantities simultaneously. ? The market price: P(Q)=aQ, where a is a constant number and Q=q1+q2. ? All the above are mon knowledge June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 7 Cournot duopoly model of inplete information (version three) cont’d ? Firm 2’s cost depends on some factor (. technology) that only firm 2 knows. Its cost can be ? HIGH: cost function: C2(q2)=cHq2. ? LOW: cost function: C2(q2)=cLq2. ? Firm 1’s cost also depends on some other (independent or dependent) factor that only firm 1 knows. Its cost can be ? HIGH: cost function: C1(q1)=cHq1. ? LOW: cost function: C1(q1)=cLq1. June 23, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 24 8 Cournot duopoly model of inplete information (version three) cont’d ? Fi rm 1 39。s qua nti ty depe nds on it s cos t. It c hoo se s ? )(1 Hcq if its cost i s HIGH ? )(1 Lcq if its cost i s LOW ? Fi rm 239。s qu ant ity al so depend s on its c os t. It c hooses ? )(2
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