金融學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯---國(guó)際貨幣和金融安排：現(xiàn)狀與未來(lái)(已修改)
2025-05-31 14:55 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 中文 3950 字 外文 原文 International Moary and Financial Arrangements: Present and Future 3. National economic policies under the present international moary system In this part, we examine central bank independence and moary and fiscal policies under the present international moary system. We also examine global financial integration and the effectiveness of moary policy. . Central bank independence In recent years, many nations have passed laws removing government control on their central bank (., making their central bank more independent) in order to overe the inflationary bias that was otherwise believed to exist in the conduct of moary policy. The central banks of some nations, such as Switzerland and Germany, have enjoyed a high degree of independence during most of the postwar period. Recently, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand enacted legislation to make their central banks more independent. In May 1997, England also did so. A mon ingredient of economic reforms in Latin America and in the exmunist nations of Central and Eastern Europe has been the creation of independent central banks—at least legally—if not yet in their actual daytoday operation. The Maastricht Treaty prohibits central banks from taking instructions from the government, as one of the requirements for moary union in Europe. To ensure central bank independence, the Treaty also requires that central bank governors be appointed for a term of at least five years. More importantly, the Treaty forbids central banks from purchasing debt instruments directly from the government and from providing credit facilities to the government. This is done in the belief that a central bank that is free from political pressure would achieve a lower inflation rate. But what is meant by central bank independence? Fisher (1995) introduced the distinction between goal independence and instrument independence. A central bank has goal independence if it can set its own goals, such as the rate of inflation that the nation should aim for. Instrument independence means that the central bank has control over the levers of moary policy. That is, it has no obligation to finance government deficits, directly or indirectly, and that it has the power to set interest rates. Of course, a central bank that has goal and instrument independence can set its own moary goals and is free to use the instruments at its disposal to achieve those goals. Even in nations with the most independent central banks, however, the government rather than the central bank usually has a final say on the type of exchange rate arrangement for the nation to have, and on changing the exchange rates in a fixed exchange rate system, or on foreign exchange market interventions to affect the level of exchange rates if the nation chooses to have a flexible exchange rate system (Capie, 1998). Theoretically, there are two different approaches to central bank independence. One is the conservativebanker approach of Rogoff (1985) and the other is the principalagent approach of Walsh (1995). In the conservativebanker approach, the central bank has both goal and instrument independence. Presumably, the conservative banker will weigh deviations of both inflation and output from target levels in setting moary policy, but with a bias in favor of lower inflation, even if this es at the expense of lower growth. In the principalagent approach, on the other hand, the central banker has instrument independence, but not goal independence. That is, the government sets the moary goal, such as the rate of inflation for the nation, and then the central bank is free to employ whatever moary instruments it has at its disposal in trying to meet the moary goal. The principalagent goal is most explicit in the case of New Zealand, where the governor of the central bank formally agrees to meet the inflation target set by the government, with his job on the line if he fai
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