【正文】 ，浮動(dòng)匯率制度明顯優(yōu)于固定匯率制度，至少在缺乏共同貨幣的時(shí)候是這樣。相對(duì)于多種貨幣間的浮動(dòng)匯率制，共同貨幣是否具有相對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)，取決于上述問(wèn)題的答案。 資料來(lái)源： 1 （注： 英文要原文。如果是網(wǎng)上的， 直接 打印原網(wǎng)頁(yè)；如果是書(shū) 或期刊等紙介印刷品上的，復(fù)印翻譯 部分。 ） 范例： EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS IN PERSPECTIVE Alan C. Stockman As an economic policy, the choice of an exchange rate regime has been oversold. That choice pales in parison with establishing a legal system that carefully defines property rights and creates an institutional framework in which people can freely utilize and trade their resources. It also is far less important than avoiding the plunder of political and legal battles that waste scarce resources to fight over the division of wealth, or avoiding taxes and regulations that create static inefficiencies and choke the forces of creativity and progress. The issue of choosing an exchange rate system is merely a subissue in the broader question of overall moary policy. And while moary policy is clearly important, its role can be easily overstated, as Milton Friedman (1968) pointed out more than three decades ago. Given the history of moary policy in the United States and around the world, including the political forces that inevitably shape the actions of governments, not to mention scientific uncertainty over many key economic questions (and regardless of the fact that many economists operating in the policy realm deny the existence of this uncertainty and arrogantly exaggerate the extent of their knowledge), probably the best way to approach the reallife policy of choosing an exchange rate regime is to take a broad perspective on how to do the least harm. The past few decades have witnessed tremendous turmoil in the exchange rate practices of the nations of the world: from the Bretton Woods system to its inevitable collapse, through a period of floating clean and dirty, 2 through pegs, devaluations, denials of devaluations, and more devaluations, through floating rates, currency boards, and the emergence of a mon currency over much of Europe. The massive swings and differences in exchange rate policies contrast with the slow emergence of greater knowledge— through advances in the logic of economic models and the accumulation of evidence— about the effects of alternative exchange rate systems. Not that this increase in knowledge has created a consensus on policy— we are simply not that far along yet, and there are many places to slip and stumble between the knowledge we have to its policy applications, as I shall discuss— but a thoughtful policy analyst cannot afford to ignore this progress or to cast a lessthancritical eye on the cacophony of claims made about exchange rates and exchange rate systems by politicians, bureaucrats, mentators, and, yes, academics. Traditional Models Factors such as the relative sizes of money demand shocks versus real shocks, the correlations among shocks in various countries, and the mobility of labor, which played such key roles in the Keynesian (MundellFleming) models of the 1960s continue to play key roles in many theoretical models appearing in major economic journals. With dominant money demand shocks, a fixed exchange rate system is supposed to be better than a flexible system, because the money supply automatically adjusts to changes in money demand, without requiring interest rate changes or price level changes, and the various shortrun disruptions that can result when nominal price levels respond sluggishly. Similarly, a floating exchange rate system is supposed to be better than a fixed rate system when the dominant shocks are real, because under a floating rate system the exchange rate can adjust— as in Milton Friedman’s “daylight saving time” s tory (Friedman 3 1953:173)— following a real shock, rather than requiring price level changes and the shortrun disruptions that sluggish nominal price levels may induce. This latter effect is supposed to be particularly important when an economy lacks substantial labor mobility— because with sufficient mobility, the workers could pack up and move. When analyzed carefully, one finds that the implications of these models can be subtle. For example, differing properties of pegged rate and floating rate systems affect optimal pricesetting by firms。 in turn, this affects the responses of production to changes in underlying conditions as well as the level of production in “normal” times. And these issues affect the models’ implications for the benefits and costs of fixed or floating exchange rates. Unfortunately, the evidence supporting the predictions of these models is only slightly better than the evidence for cold nuclear fusion. Consequently, it is hard to take seriously these issues as the major factors that should be involved in a policy decision. Moreover, the logic that reaches these conclusions about exchange rate policies is rather shallow. For example, the Fed is well aware that money demand