國外博弈論課件lecture(20)(已改無錯字)
2022-11-19 13:59:00 本頁面
【正文】 2 0, 0 Player 1 C D 2, 0 Player 2 E F Player 1 G H 3, 1 1, 2 0, 0 Player 1 G H 1, 2 0, 0 June 5, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 13 20 Subgameperfect Nash equilibrium ? A Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is subgameperfect if the strategies of the Nash equilibrium constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the game. ? Subgameperfect Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. June 5, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 13 21 Entry game ? Two Nash equilibria ? ( In, Acmodate ) is subgameperfect. ? ( Out, Fight ) is not subgameperfect because it does not induce a Nash equilibrium in the subgame beginning at Incumbent. Challenger In Out Incumbent A F 1, 2 2, 1 0, 0 Incumbent A F 2, 1 0, 0 Acmodate is the Nash equilibrium in this subgame. June 5, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 13 22 Find subgame perfect Nash equilibria: backward induction ? Starting with those smallest subgames ? Then move backward until the root is reached Challenger In Out Incumbent A F 1, 2 2, 1 0, 0 The first number is the payoff of the challenger. The second number is the payoff of the incumbent. June 5, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 13 23 Find subgame perfect Nash equilibria: backward induction ? Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (DG, E) ? Player 1 plays D, and plays G if player 2 plays E ? Player 2 plays E if player 1 plays C Player 2 E F Player 1 G H 3, 1 1, 2 0, 0 Player 1 C D 2, 0 June 5, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 13 24 Existence of subgameperfect Nash equilibrium ? Every finite dynamic game of plete and perfect information has a subgameperfect Nash equilibrium that can be found by backward induction. June 5, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 13 25 Sequential bargaining ( of Gibbons) ? Player 1 and 2 are bargaining over one dollar. The timing is as follows: ? At the beginning of the first period, player 1 proposes to take a share s1 of the dollar, leaving 1s1 to player 2. ? Player 2 either accepts the offer or rejects the offer (in which case play continues to the second period) ? At the beginning of the second period, player 2 proposes that player 1 take a share s2 of the dollar, leaving 1s2 to player 2. ? Player 1 either accepts the offer or rejects the offer (in which case
教學課件相關推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號-1