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2024-12-21 16:13本頁面
【正文】 n research focuses on the principalagent framework and assumes a universal link between executive incentives and performance outes. We suggest a framework that examines executive pensation in terms of its anizational contexts and potential plementarities/ substitution effects between different corporate governance practices at both the firm and national levels. We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive pensation policy such as ―soft law‖ and ―hard law.‖ Over the past two decades, panies around the world have increasingly moved from a fixed pay structure to remuneration schemes that are related to performance and include a substantial ponent of equitybased incentives. As a result, research on the economic effects of executive pensation has bee one of the hotly debated topics within corporate governance research. As Bruce, Buck, and Main (2021, p. 1493) indicated, ―In recent years, literature on executive remuneration has grown at a pace rivaled only by the growth of executive pay itself. Most of the empirical literature on executive pensation has focused predominantly on the ./. corporate sectors when analyzing anizational outes of different ponents of executive pay, such as cash pay (salary and bonus), longterm incentives (., executive stock options), and perquisites (., pension contributions and pany cars). In terms of its theoretical underpinnings, previous research has attempted to understand executive pensation in terms of agency theory and explored links between different forms of executive incentives and firm performance. This literature is motivated by the assumption that, by managing the principalagency problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better. Much of corporate governance research is based on a universal model outlined by principalagent theory (Fama amp。 Jensen, 1986), and the central premise of this framework is that shareholders and managers have different access to firmspecific information and broadly divergent interests and risk preferences. As a result, managers as agents of shareholders (principals) can engage in selfserving behavior that may be detrimental to shareholders’ wealth maximization. A substantial body of literature is based on this straightforward premise and suggests that, to constrain managerial opportunism, shareholders may use a diverse range of corporate governance mechanisms, including various equitybased managerial incentives that align the interests of agents and principals. As Jensen and Murphy (1990, pp. 242– 243) observed, ―Agency theory predicts that pensation policy will tie the agent’s expected utility to the principal’s objective. The objective of shareholders is to
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