低碳經(jīng)濟論文：低碳經(jīng)濟國際合作博弈分析與機制研究-在線瀏覽
2024-08-07 12:21本頁面
【正文】 efers to distribute global carbon emissions among countries, and define national emissions limits, making this limits as a can of “property.” This is based on the Coase Theorem. Clear property rights can effectively solve the problem of inadequate supply of public goods to achieve the optimal allocation of resources. “Two distributions” is to allocate the carbon emissions twice to achieve the balance between fairness and efficiency. In consideration of different stages in economic development among nations, the first distribution will launch on fairness to meet the priority of economic development. The second allocation will depend on the market in order to achieve the optimal allocation of global resources, minimizing the cost.”A property, two distributions” not only satisfies the equality on the right to subsistence and development, but also effectively improves the benefits of low carbon economy and reduce its costs. However, there has high transaction costs and lacks international monitoring mechanisms in the international munity. So we should construct international cooperation mechanisms to achieve international cooperation. Based on this, we construct the costsharing mechanism, selective incentives mechanism, carbon trading mechanism and participation mechanism for environmental nongovernmental organizations. Costsharing mechanism follows “Who emits, Who bears” pr
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