【正文】 e. But the reservoir of women able and willing to take up paid work is running low, and the babyboomers are going grey. In many countries immigrants have been filling such gaps in the labour force as have already emerged (and remember that the real shortage is still around ten years off). Immigration in the developed world is the highest it has ever been, and it is making a useful difference. In stillfertile America it currently accounts for about 40% of total population growth, and in fastageing western Europe for about 90%. On the face of it, it seems the perfect solution. Many developing countries have lots of young people in need of jobs。 many rich countries need helping hands that will boost tax revenues and keep up economic growth. But over the next few decades labour forces in rich countries are set to shrink so much that inflows of immigrants would have to increase enormously to pensate: to at least twice their current size in western Europe‘s most youthful countries, and three times in the older ones. Japan would need a large multiple of the few immigrants it has at present. Public opinion polls show that people in most rich countries already think that immigration is too high. Further big increases would be politically unfeasible. To tackle the problem of ageing populations at its root, ―old‖ countries would have to rejuvenate (使年輕 ) themselves by having more of their own children. A number of them have tried, some more successfully than others. But it is not a simple matter of offering financial incentives or providing more child care. Modern urban life in rich countries is not well adapted to large families. Women find it hard to bine family and career. They often promise by having just one child. And if fertility in ageing countries does not pick up? It will not be the end of the world, at least not for quite a while yet, but the world will slowly bee a different place. Older societies may be less innovative and more strongly disinclined to take risks than younger ones. By 2025 at the latest, about half the voters in America and most of those in western European countries will be over 50—and older people turn out to vote in much greater number than younger ones. Academic studies have found no evidence so far that older voters have used their power at the ballot box to push for policies that specifically benefit them, though if in future there are many more of them they might start doing so. Nor is there any sign of the intergenerational warfare predicted in the 1990s. After all, older people themselves mostly have families. In a recent study of parents and grownup children in 11 European countries, Karsten Hank of Mannheim University found that 85% of them lived within 25km of each other and the majority of them were in touch at least once a week. Even so, the shift in the centre of gravity to older age groups is bound to have a profound effect on societies, not just economically and politically but in all sorts of other ways too. Richard Jackson and Neil Howe of America‘s CSIS, in a thoughtful book called The Graying of the Great Powers, argue that, among other things, the ageing of the developed countries will have a number of serious security implications. For example, the shortage of young adults is likely to make countries more reluctant to mit the few they have to military service. In the decades to 2050, America will find itself playing an everincreasing role in the developed world‘s defence effort. Because America‘s population will still be growing when that of most other developed countries is shrinking, America will be the only developed country that still matters geopolitically (地緣政治上 ). Ask me in 2020 There is little that can be done to stop population ageing, so the world will have to live with it. But some of the consequences can be alleviated. Many experts now believe that given the right policies, the effects, though grave, need not be catastrophic. Most countries have recognised the need to do something and are beginning to act. But even then there is no guarantee that their efforts will work. What is happening now is historically unprecedented. Ronald Lee, director of the Centre on the Economics and Demography of Ageing at the University of California, Berkeley, puts it briefly and clearly: ―We don‘t really know what population ageing will be like, because nobody has done it yet. ― 注意：此部分試 題請(qǐng)?jiān)诖痤}卡 1 上作答。 47. Most young boys have been trained to believe that men who show tender feelings are considered to be ______________. 48. Some men believe that if they expressed their emotions openly they might ______________. 49. According to the author, men who suppress their emotions may develop ______________. 50. Men who observe traditional masculine norms are said to derive less satisfaction from ______________. 51. When males get angry, they can bee ______________ or even mit violence. Section B Directions: There are 2 passages in this section. Each passage is followed by some questions or unfinished statements. For each of them there are four choices marked [A], [B], [C] and [D] You should decide on the best choice and mark the corresponding letter on Answer Sheet 2 with a single line through the centre. Passage One Questions 52 to 56 are based on the following passage. In the early 20th century, few things were more appealing than the promise of scientific knowledge. In a world struggling with rapid industrialization, science and technology seemed to offer solutions to almost every problem. Newly created state colleges and universities devoted themselves almost entirely to scientific, technological, and engineering fields. Many Americans came to believe that scientific certainty could not only solve scientific problems, but also reform politics, government, and business. Two world wars an