高級微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)publicgoodsandexternality-在線瀏覽
2024-11-01 09:06本頁面
【正文】 ing (Condorcet paradox) – Singlepeaked preference (i pay fraction si for G), has a unique maximum. – Majority rule and median voter. – Bowen equilibrium ()iiu G s G?()mmu G s? ?Public goods ? Lindahl allocation: – Everybody have a petitive market to buy the public goods: – First order condition: ,m a x ( , ) . . iiiGxi i iu G xs t w p G x??iiiiuu pGx?? ???Public goods ? Revealing mechanism of demand for public goods. – How to reveal the pi? ? The GrovesClarke Mechanism – Each agent report a bid for the public good, bi. – The public goods is provided if – Each agent i receives a sidepayment equal to the other bids ,if the public goods is provided. 0iib ??0jjib???Public goods ? The GrovesClarke Mechanism if 0p a y o f f to 0 if 0i j i jj i j iijjiv b b bibb???? ? ? ??? ????????Externality ? What’s externality? ? Private cost and social cost See the fig. 1 m a x ( )x p x c x? ??2 ()ex? ??Externality ? Integration: internalize the externality. ? Pigovian taxes m a x ( ) ( )xp x c x e x? ? ? ?m a x ( )xp x c x t x? ? ? ?
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