【正文】 rol for the time trend. All the nominal variables are deflated by GDP deflator and expressed at constant price of 198788. (Insert Table1 here) T a b l e 1: D e s c r i p t i ve s t at i s t i c s (M BV R) i s r at i o o f c l os i ng pr i c e o f t he e qui t y t o b ook v a l ue of e qui t y at t he e nd o f t he f i nan c i a l y e ar . L E V E R A G E i s t he ra t i o o f t ot a l a m oun t of l on g t e rm de bt t o t o t a l a m oun t of e qui t y c a p i t a l . P A Y _O U T i s t he ra t i o o f t ot a l di vi de nd t o t o t a l e a rni n g of t he fi rm . R e t urn on e qui t y (R O E ) i s t he ra t i o o f ne t p rofi t t o n e t w or t h o f t he fi rm . A SSE T t ot a l a s s e t s of t he fi rm . V a r i a b l e A l l F i r m s L a r g e F i r m s S m a l l F i r m s G r o u p F i r m s I n d i a n S t a n d a l o n e F i r m s F o r e i g n S t a n d a l o n e F i r m s M B V R L E V E R A G E D I V I D E N D P A Y O F F 3 . 1 3 7 ( 5 . 9 9 3 ) 1 . 7 2 6 ( 4 . 1 4 0 ) 0 . 0 2 3 ( 0 . 0 2 9 ) 2 . 1 3 3 ( 3 . 5 3 7 ) 3 . 0 5 7 ( 7 . 1 5 1 ) 0 . 0 2 5 ( 0 . 0 2 8 ) 3 . 3 4 9 ( 6 . 3 7 2 ) 1 . 4 4 1 ( 3 . 0 6 3 ) 0 . 0 2 3 ( 0 . 0 2 9 ) 2 . 8 3 3 ( 5 . 6 5 9 ) 1 . 9 7 3 ( 4 . 4 7 0 ) 0 . 0 2 4 ( 0 . 0 3 0 ) 2 . 8 5 0 ( 5 . 1 1 9 ) 1 . 2 4 7 ( 3 . 0 9 4 ) 0 . 0 2 4 ( 0 . 0 26) 5 . 7 7 6 ( 8 . 2 5 5 ) 0 . 3 1 9 ( 0 . 4 8 4 ) 0 . 0 2 0 ( 0 . 0 2 3 ) P R O F I T A B I L I T Y ( R O E ) 0 . 1 3 8 ( 0 . 3 6 7 ) 0 . 0 9 5 ( 0 . 4 4 9 ) 0 . 1 4 8 ( 0 . 3 4 6 ) 0 . 1 3 3 ( 0 . 3 7 2 ) 0 . 1 6 8 ( 0 . 2 8 3 ) 0 . 1 4 8 ( 0 . Table 1 shows the mean values and the standard deviations (in parenthesis) of the variables under consideration under six different cases (namely, all firms, large firms, small firms, groupaffiliated firms, Indian standalone firms and foreign standalone firms). The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 shows that the value of a firm, in terms of MBVR, is higher for the small firms and the foreign standalone firms. Large firms get more leverage than any other category of firms. Profitability of the firm, in terms of ROE, is higher for the Indian standalone panies. Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix between the variables of interest. It shows that MBVR has significant negative correlation with leverage and size of the firm and positive correlation with dividend policy and profitability of the firm. In the Appendix Figure 1 and 4 show that with the ushering of economic liberalization there is a sharp rise in MBVR and ROE in the year 1992, which have gradually decreased over the years. Figure 2 shows since post liberalization period, the leverage has shown an increasing trend. However, dividend payout policy does not depict any significant trend over this period. The coefficient of lagged value of leverage () and its square term ()imply that as the leverage of the firm increases, the probability of raise in future firm’s values declines at a decreasing rate. The negative influence of leverage on the probability of future value creation was observed across the ownership groups and size. The profitability of the firm (as apparent from the coefficient of ROE) increases the probability of increase in future value creation. Point to note is, this increase is higher for foreign standalone firms as pare to Indian standalone or groupaffiliated the OLS model, the dividend payout did not significantly explain the chance of future value creation. Neither in the pooled model nor in the size and ownership group specific regression the coefficient of payout was significantly different from zero at 10per cent level. Result This paper analyzed the accounting factor t