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財務(wù)報表舞弊的原因,后果和威脅外文翻譯-其他專業(yè)-在線瀏覽

2025-03-24 01:55本頁面
  

【正文】 r ideological motives can play a role in financial statement fraud. Economic pressure and incentives to meet Wall Street forecasts are the fundamental motives for publicly traded panies to engage in financial statement fraud. Financial statement fraud is more likely to occur when a pany has a strong motive and economic reason to report more favorable financial performance than otherwise would be reported by plying with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) requirements. The fourth letter in the word “CRIME” is “M”, which stands for “MONITORING”. The financial reporting process of publicly traded panies includes a monitoring mechanism. The monitoring mechanism consists of (1) a direct oversight function of the board of directors, the audit mittee, external auditors, and regulatory agencies and (2) an indirect overseeing function by those who follow the pany in the role of owner/investor as an intermediary such as analysts, institutional investors, and investment bankers. The last letter in the word “CRIME” is “E”, which stands for “END RESULTS”. There must be a strong motivation for corporations to engage in financial statement fraud because the costs of corporate offenses can be very significant. Davidson et al. (1994) find that the capital markets did not view all corporate offenses as equally severe and thus, the market reacted differently to the seriousness of violations by corporations. Feroz et al. (1991) studied 188 firms that were sanctioned by the SEC and find that penalties for even unsuccessful financial statement fraud are significant. Davidson et al.( 1994) detect no evidence of a stock market effect for firms indicted for tax evasion, theft of trade secrets, kickbacks, and over charging customers while they detected significant negative stock market effects for firms indicted on charges of bribery, pricefixing, or fraudulent financial reporting. Dechow et al. (1996) find that the cost of capital for firms convicted of financial statement fraud significantly increased. Given the high cost associated with financial statement fraud and even unsuccessful fraudulent financial reporting act
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