【正文】 Resale Values 221)1()(39。Systemic Liquidity and the Composition of Foreign Investment: Theory and Empirical Evidence Theory and Empirics by Itay Goldstein, Assaf Razin, and Hui Tong February 2021 The key prediction of the model is that countries that have a high probability of an aggregate liquidity crisis will be the source of more FPI and less FDI. The intuition is that as the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock increases, agents know that they are more likely to need to sell the investment early, in which case, if they hold FDI, they will get a low price since buyers do not know whether they sell because of an individual liquidity need or because of adverse information on the productivity of the investment. As a result, the attractiveness of FDI decreases, and the ratio of FPI to FDI increases. “ Imagine a large pany that has many relatively small , each shareholder faces the following wellknown freerider problem:if the shareholder does something to improve the quality of management, then the benefits will be enjoyed by all shareholders. Unless the shareholder is altruistic, she will ignore this beneficial effect on other shareholders and so will underinvest in the activity of monitoring or improving management.” Oliver Hart. The Efficiency Advantage The Disadvantage: A Premature Liquidation However, when investors want to sell their investment prematurely, because of a liquidity shock, they will get lower price if they are conceived by the buyer to have more information. Because, other investors know That the seller has information on the Fundamentals and suspect That the sales result from bad prospects of the project Rather than liquidity shortage. Liquidity Shocks and Resale Values 221)1()(39。)(,1)1(,0)1(),()1)((AKKRGgGGGc dfKFR????????????????Three periods: 0, 1, 2。)(,1)1(,0)1(),()1)((AKKRGgGGGc dfKFR????????????????Three periods: 0, 1, 2。 of them have high expected liquidity needs, , and proportion 189。 that the investor is selling because of liquidity needs, and a Probability of 189。)/(2A)). Thus, whether or not a direct investor sells the investment, he is able to extract the value (((1+ε)178。))/(2A))C. The expected value from investing in FPI is (1/(2A)) as before. This is because the kind of disclosure requirements we describe here do not affect the value of portfolio investments. These are requirements that are imposed by the source country, and thus apply only for investments that are being controlled by sourcecountry Analyzing the trade off between FDI and FPI under this perfect sourcecountry transparency, we can see two things. First, with transparency, FDI bees more attractive than before. Second, with transparency, the decision between FDI and FPI ceases to be a function of the probability of a liquidity shock. second empirical prediction The effect of the probability of a liquidity shock on the ratio of FPI and FDI increases in the level of opacity in the source country. Ratio of FPI and FDI Probit Dynamic Version Transparency Data ? The theory is geared toward explaining the allocation of the shock of foreign capital between portfolio and direct foreign investors. Now we confront this hypothesis with the data. The latter consist of stocks of FPI and FDI in market value, that are piled by Lane and MilesiFerretti (2021).See Summary Statistics. T ab l e 1. S u m m ar y S t at is t ics of F P I /F D I T a bl e 1 p r e s e n t s t he a v e r a g e o f t he l o g o f F P I s t o c k o v e r F D I s t o c k f o r 140 s o ur c e c o unt r i e s f o r t he p e r i o d f r o m 199 0 t o 2021 . O bs i s t h e num be r o f no n m i s s i ng o bs e r v a t i o ns f o r e a c h s o ur c e c o unt r y . C o unt r i e s w i t h no o bs e r v a t i o ns a t a l l d ur i ng t hi s pe r i o d a r e no t r e po r t e d. S o ur c e : L a ne a nd M i l e s i F e r r e t t i ( 2021 ) . C ou n tr y N am e O b s M e an C ou n tr y N am e O b s M e an U ni t e d S t a t e s 15 0. 56 C a m bo di a 8 0. 09 U ni t e d K i ng do m 15 0. 14 T a i w a n P r o v i nc e o f C hi na 15 1. 14 A us t r i a 15 0. 32 H o ng K o ng S . A . R . o f C hi na 15 1. 37 B e l g i um 15 0. 37 I ndi a 15 0. 67 D e nm a r k 15 0. 69 I nd o ne s i a 4 4. 51 F r a nc e 15 1. 57 K o r e a 15 2. 18 G e r m a ny 15 0. 28 M a l a y s i a 15 2. 27 I t a l y 15 0. 40 P a ki s t a n 3 2. 51 L uxe m bo ur g 5 0. 22 P hi l i p pi n e s 15 0. 17 N e t he r l a nd s 15 0. 58 S i ng a po r e 15 0. 05 N o r w a y 15 0. 88 T ha i l a n d 14 3. 66 S w e de n 15 1. 11 A l g e r i a 14 7. 45 S w i t z e r l a nd 15 0. 10 B o t s w a na 11 0. 16 C a na d a 15 0. 05 C o ngo , R e pub l i c o f 10 0. 30 J a pa n 15 0. 52 B e ni n 9 3. 63 F i n l a nd 15 2. 27 G a bo n 7 2. 98 G r e e c e 15 0. 62 C 244。 I vo i r e 14 1. 07 I c e l a nd 14 0. 24 K e ny a 15 3. 48 I r e l a nd 15 1. 02 L i b y a 15 3. 04 M a l t a 11 1. 39 M a l i 8 3. 66 P o r t ug a l 15 0. 50 M a u r i t i us 6 1. 38 S pa i n 15 1. 26 N i g e r 8 5. 38 T ur ke y 14 0. 43 R w a nda 6 0. 33 A us t r a l i a 15 0. 64 S e ne g a l 15 1. 27 N e w Z e a l a nd 15 0. 72 N a m i b i a 14 0. 65 S o ut h A f r i c a 15 0. 66 S w a z i l a nd 13 3. 94 A r g e nt i na 15 0. 16 T o go 13 1. 95 B r a z i l 15 2. 91 T uni s i a 15 2. 08 C hi l e 15 0. 22 B ur k i na F a s o 5 2. 04 C o l o m bi a 15 0. 91 A r m e ni