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on via majority or full ownership (Buckley/Casson 1976, Dunning 1993). This is also evident in the early years of Chinese ODI development: project level SAFE data reveal that, in the early 1990s, around 70 percent of overseas projects of Chinese ?rms took the IJV form (see Table 5). Zhan (1995) also reports that Chinese ?rms tended to opt for majority equity shareholdings in overseas projects, typically in the range of 40 to 70 percent equity participation, especially in natural resourceoriented and manufacturingrelated projects. A number of explanations can be envisaged. From a governmental perspective, the formal investment approval process generally required Chinese MNEs to adopt the IJV entry mode. The Chinese authorities had bee familiar with the economic gains associated with the promotion of inward FDI in the form of IJVs, the promotion of which was a cornerstone of China?s ?Open Door? policy. The JV form was seen as a vehicle for promoting the in?ow of foreignowned technology, management knowhow and other skills to China. The authorities were also now adept and fortable with at administering foreign invested enterprises in China. It is likely that equivalent advantages were sought when Chinese enterprises invested 2 abroad. Familiar cost and riskminimising features of IJVs will also have been important to the investment approval agencies (Zhan 1995, Taylor 2020, Wang 2020). From an enterprise perspective, inef?cient domestic capital markets and budget constraints meant that many Chinese enterprises, including stateowned ones, often found it dif?cult to obtain suf?cient funds to purchase overseas assets outright, pelling them to opt for the IJV alternative. The JV form also allowed Chinese MNEs to exercise a degree of control over local operations whilst avoiding outright ownership and the conitant exposure to political and mercial risk. Chinese enterprises could tap foreign partner contributions, such as improved access to market intelligence, knowledge of the local operating environment, opportunities for reputation riding and better access to local distribution channels through the IJV (Taylor 2020). When established with other ethnicallyChinese enterprises (in Hong Kong and elsewhere), the JV form also allowed relational assets to be optimised, reducing perceived risks and costs associated with psychic distance, especially for smaller and less experienced Chinese investors (Zhan 1995). Mutual trust would also have been easier to establish. Thus, we see both institutional and ?rmspeci?c factors in?uencing the choice of IJV by Chinese ?rms at this time. From the mid1990s onwards, however, SAFE data at individual project level reveal that whollyowned FDI projects have increasingly substituted for jointlyowned ones in the international expansion of Chinese enterprise, with 61 percent of overseas af?liates in approved projects taking this form in 2020 pared to 30 percent in 1991. We note that this contrasts somewhat with the ?ndings of Taylor (2020), who reports much greater use of IJVs in the recent internationalisation of Chinese ?rms, esp